Justine Greening served as Secretary for Education from 2016 to 2018. Prior to that, she served as Economic Secretary to the Treasury from 2010 to 2011, Secretary of State for Transport from 2011 to 2012 and Secretary of State for International Development from 2012 to 2016.
This interview was conducted on 20 September 2023.
Q: Tell us how you’ve been involved with regional policy in the last 40 years?
First as a treasury minister, working with George Osborne and Danny Alexander on the City Deals – I was the Economic Secretary. Second, as Transport Secretary, looking at some big investment projects like HS2, rail investment and electrification, but also more localised road projects and bus investment. Then third as Education Secretary, obviously focused on localised education policy and, in particular, an overriding objective of social mobility.
The final role that I had that informed some of my time in education was the one I had before it, International Development, which saw me doing a lot of thinking about regeneration and development, but for places that were not the UK. It was interesting to see the way in which comparable challenges were faced from a development economics perspective compared to how we perhaps faced them here in the UK.
Q: What stands out for you as being the big success in regional growth, and also the big frustration?
The successes were around more comprehensive and locally owned strategies, like the City Deals and the Opportunity Areas that we did. I think that enabled much more tailored strategies to be put in place. But overwhelmingly, I would say my assessment of policy is much more characterised by many frustrations of overly simplistic policy diagnosis, and a lack of willingness in the political system to stick with long-term policy shifts and to be patient. There was never a sufficient desire to have patient policy, if I can call it that, in order to allow change to happen on the ground and to understand that from an evidence-based perspective. Digging into those in detail, because I think this is where we really get to the heart of it: over recent decades, what’s driving the economy has shifted, causing an intractable problem around regeneration. I grew up in Rotherham. My dad was unemployed when our steel industry just wasn’t competitive in relation to India. That was partly labour cost. It was partly because we needed better investment and processes, all that. But that was then. Now, it’s much more about human capital and skills. The problems have become more complex.
What we’ve not recognised is we talk about social mobility cold spots, but effectively, they are economic systems that have different challenges driving their performances. When we were doing Opportunity Areas, I dug into three different kinds of opportunity areas specifically to test out the different challenges. One was the conventional urban deprivation system that I was interested in. The second was seaside coastal areas where there’s a level of isolation and one-half of your area around you is sea with no one.
For teacher recruitment, if literally half of your catchment area doesn’t have anyone in it, you are going to have a particular set of challenges. Then the third one that we really dug into was rural. I think the problem is that there isn’t that level of policy understanding that all of them pose different challenges in terms of hardware investment versus software investment if I can talk about human capital and physical infrastructure like that. They all pose challenges in terms of how their talent markets and education markets operate, and they all face different challenges in relation to their economies. In the urban deprived opportunity areas, we found it was actually easier to get people mobilised because they were in close proximity, because of so many decades of inward investment. There are actually good networks that were already there that you could harness. They were very different, for example, to the seaside opportunity areas where actually they were isolated and therefore, they had a physical challenge of connection. But actually, the isolation we discovered had made the human network really well identified.
People had a very clear sense of local identity because they didn’t tend to go anywhere else. The easiest ones, by far, were the ones, actually the seaside ones, where there was also a local economy that was well-networked. So, whether you were people or a business, you were kind of thrown together and had to survive. The hardest ones were the rural ones where there was almost a fragmented talent base. So, it’s really hard to get people to school and colleges and also a fragmented economic base with lots of SMEs, none of them really that close together. But all of these have really different challenges and therefore, we can’t diagnose them in the same way. If I was Development Secretary, looking at the theory of change that I might want to invest in, they’re actually quite different and distinct theories. But none of that came through, for example, when I was in Treasury, none of that came through in Transport. As a result, I think often we’re trying to do a one-size-fits-all when that is just never going to work.
Q: You can crudely characterise the 1980s into the 1990s as a period where through privatisation and Foreign Direct Investment, the government is driving a national economic policy, it’s not hugely place-orientated…
You can argue that any regional orientation was really driven by the businesses that respond to that macro investment climate like Nissan, for example.
Q: But then policy shifts to have a more regional focus in the 2000s and then local in the 2010s, how does that interact with your frustration about policy not being sufficiently focused on the needs of different places?
We didn’t learn from the shortcomings of the policies of the 1980s and 1990s. What they told us was that it’s going to be private sector investment that often gives you these long-term improvements in areas like Teeside. You can contrast what happened where I grew up in Rotherham, where there was no Nissan that came, versus what happened in Newcastle – and all of that Nissan investment is still there today. One of the points I did want to make was to question this assumption by policymakers that the anchor institution that drives the change process has to be political. Look in the 1980s at Westland helicopters in Yeovil, what we failed to realise was that we need big employers as anchor institutions. We know they’re big employers, but we don’t necessarily see them as a route to do a broader transformation. I don’t think they necessarily saw themselves as that.
The second thing is that one size doesn’t fit all. The RDAs were, for some communities, just too big – amorphous and unable to almost tailor to the extent that different social mobility cold spots needed. Then you get to the City Deals and of course they work for cities, but they’re not so good for rural areas. The reality is you will need to have an approach that takes what you’ve learned from all of those things, understands what the change processes have been, where we’ve seen change happen – actually, Manchester and maybe Birmingham are good examples, but particularly Manchester. Then take those learnings but adapt them for some really different communities and recognise metro mayors are probably only going to work in urban areas, and that’s fine. But for rural areas, we may need an entirely different growth and regional policy. That should be absolutely fine. We shouldn’t worry about how the change process is triggered.
This is what I saw in schools as well. We brought in academy trusts and all of that. When you dig into the detail of what they’re achieving, actually, the successful ones were able to fundamentally kick off a change process. But that change process didn’t necessarily need an academy to do it. It’s just that academies were often a good way of changing the staff and the leadership team and then triggering a fresh phase. But they weren’t the only way to do it. We need to identify the first-order challenge and distinguish that from some of these policies which were ways of delivering that, but they weren’t the only way, whereas politicians can only see their way.
Q: What was the Treasury’s attitude to local government – and was there a difference in local capacity between cities and towns or rural areas?
There was a difference in capacity, and that was driven by different things. A big part of that was leadership. I’ve talked to many council leaders doing my social mobility work and I’ve been staggered by the variation in the people that I speak to. Some of them are genuine leaders. They are innovative. Say, Louise McKinney, deputy leader of Essex County Council. She’d be a brilliant minister and she’s a superb local government politician. I can think of others I’ve talked to that I wouldn’t leave in charge of my house if I went on holiday. Maybe that’s the same as ministers, but it utterly dictates what happens.
I remember doing HS2 and going to Sheffield to talk about the station we might have there. There was an option to have it in Meadowhall, between Sheffield and Rotherham. The Rotherham team came in and I said to their leader, ‘Are you actually going to ask for this? Because Sheffield did a brilliant job and they want their station. But you have got to do the Meadowhall bid, otherwise, who is going to make the case?’ He never made the case. As somebody who came from Rotherham, I remember saying to him, ‘It’s your job to argue for Meadowhall. I’m looking at it because I know the difference it will make to Rotherham.’ He was a very good example, a leader who should have been out beating the drum for his community and investing on his doorstep, and he didn’t. It made it a lot harder for the system to shift to invest because he clearly wasn’t leading a council that was even remotely able to run itself, let alone engage with the big infrastructure project. I think there’s a Catch 22, and we’ve seen this in London, where great officials like to work in places like Wandsworth because the council is well-run. Labour won it by saying ‘We’re not going to change anything’.
I think the final spin on this is there are some councils that switch regularly at elections between parties. I think it makes it very hard for them to get any long-term traction to then engage with the government on long-term plans. You can contrast that with, say, Manchester or Birmingham, where they just steadily, particularly Manchester, got their act together through the whole city deal process, and you could see the other cities like Liverpool and Sheffield, Birmingham, thinking, ‘Hang on a minute, they’ve stolen a march on us. We’re going to have to get our act together’.
Q: Do those capacity issues cap how far you can go with combined authorities or elected mayors?
I think it’s wrong to characterise devolution as just Whitehall handing over powers. The Opportunity Areas were not devolution, but they were at the same time. They were me saying, ’I want us to have a collective plan that we all own but is shaped at a local level, but I will personally sign it off.’ We literally had Department for Education officials embedded in those teams. So, it wasn’t devolution, but it was nevertheless allowing them to be able to tailor their priorities, but in a way that we all had agreed and were all then supporting. There wasn’t a lot of money that went with opportunity areas, but they did progress.
But the second point I want to make is that, yes, there are some places where it’s just not going to happen. I stood down at the last election because I said I wanted to work on social mobility outside of Parliament. The reason for that was I believed that politics had stopped being able to drive enough change in the country, and I like to drive change, especially on this issue that I care about hugely. I think for a significant number of places, it’s the politics, that’s the problem. Therefore, my assessment is that we have to find ways other than politics to drive change. So, if you’re in those parts of the country, I think what we’re beginning to learn is that the anchor institution could be a local university that can coordinate and galvanise and has the capacity. Or it could be a local employer or both perhaps.
Southampton is a good example of an authority that changes a lot. It’s very marginal. So perhaps it’s not a surprise that it’s hard to get long-term regeneration projects. But there is a free port proposal there now, and that will be a long-term project. If you can get that, plus the universities and other local businesses acting strategically, then maybe they can do the leadership bit, if you like, the local authority can play the role it can play, but maybe it isn’t all on their shoulders to deliver.
Q: How far do you take your laissez-faire approach, different solutions for different places and see what works, and how much do need a view from Whitehall about how this should be done?
I am making a case for not one size fits all. I think the problem is we tried all of this. There’s a reason why a Yes Minister episode is focused on local government reform because it just often doesn’t really get anywhere. I think what we’ve learned is that by and large, it turns out that devolution is good. So, we should be aiming to do as much as we can in as many places as we can. But we can’t expect that that will bear the full weight. There will probably be one in three places where we’re going to have to think more because we’ve got to succeed in the real world as we actually find it, not the world that we want. This is constantly what I used to say in the Education department. It’s complicated, and I’m afraid that’s just something we’ve got to get over.
Q: Michael Heseltine would say the big mistake in the early 1970s was not to reorganise local government across bigger areas. Michael Gove would say, politically, that’s too difficult because of local opposition. But you’re saying something different, which is that actually, even if you could do it, it might not be the right way to do it for some places?
If there isn’t the capacity. This is why I’m saying you have to diagnose the system and what’s wrong with the system, because the solution may not be the structure. Kettering is a great example. The Local MP Philip Hollobone always used to raise issues on Kettering in education questions. I went back into the department and said, ‘Right, what is going on in Kettering? It’s never on any list. I want to get into what on earth is happening.’ So, I sent the departmental delivery team off to Kettering for a week. What they came back and told me was that the equilibrium – this is my take of it – economically, the equilibrium was not where we wanted it, but it was absolutely fine for the local system. What was happening was Kettering had lots of factories with quite a lot of factory jobs. The schools were doing a perfectly decent job of turning out talent to go into those factories. The parents worked in the factory, so they weren’t particularly necessarily aspirational enough to turn around to schools and go, ‘You’re pretty crap, my kid could have got a managerial job if you were doing better’.
Why wasn’t there any force for change? The local council was a failing one, Northamptonshire. It hadn’t gone bust at that stage, but it could barely run itself, let alone get upset about the fact that local schools weren’t doing remotely well enough. Certainly, it couldn’t do an economic strategy that might have brought in new investment and new roles that would have triggered a conversation about improving skills. It was also misaligned with the local NHS regions, Kettering had two NHS regions that it was reporting into. In other words, its problem was that it was on nobody’s radar because it was right at the edge of everybody’s span of control and because nothing had actually gone tits up education-wise. It was never going to get to the top of my or the Treasury or anyone else’s list. And yet it was failing effectively because it was massively underperforming on lots of multiple levels.
Q: Your view is you can’t leave that to the local electorate or even an elected mayor, that there are places where you should say ‘we can do better than this’ from the centre?
No. My view is you’ve got to say to Kettering, ‘Right, things have got to be better’. You can’t leave it to the structures to deliver because they’re never going to, because you have to not only sort out local government reform, you’d have to sort out the NHS command and control structures to align with it, you’d have to sort out police and crime. If you’re looking down a list of what has to be in place for talent to thrive and then connect opportunities, it’s too messy. So, you need a game plan that says in those circumstances you’ve always got to go back to that micro level and start from the grassroots because actually, top-down isn’t going to work. You have to start bottom up.
Q: But it might be that that requires somebody other than local elected leadership to be looking for the university or the company or the other local catalyst?
Maybe it is national government. But it’s recognising that this isn’t about a local government reform. It’s about reaching out to Northampton University to say, ‘Right, what are we going to do here?’ Northampton University just had a brand new campus, tons of investment, was completely well placed to develop the talent and give a local economy what it needs. But there’s no economic strategy to create the jobs for those students. I guarantee that Treasury will turn around and go, ‘Oh Northampton University, that’s not very good, wasting all that money, putting students through it.’ That’s not the issue. That’s a successful part of the strategy. The failing part of the strategy is the economic environment in which it’s turning out talent to connect up to that just isn’t there.
Q: Some people in academia talk as if there is a common Whitehall or Westminster view. How would you characterise the Whitehall, Westminster view across departments?
I felt that other departments often saw city deals as the start of a Treasury land grab, policy-wise – where they had their own strategies for what they were doing at a regional and local level and then suddenly the city deal process kicked off where they were being lectured by these other departments, two departments in particular, about what they needed to give in terms of evolution for the city deal to work. It was probably seen by some departments as yet another way for Treasury to interfere. It was in part, definitely. But that’s down to weak capacity across government and lack of trust in the Treasury to act as a common broker, to be a cross-cutting department that brought others together interestingly.
Q: There is a common refrain across departmental ministers as well as local government that local areas ought to have been able to have much more strategic control over strategy towards post-18 skills – is there something deep in the education and skills universe, the DNA, and not just in schools policy, which doesn’t really want to engage with local spatial policy?
Definitely for me as Education Secretary there were times when I did resist devolution. There’s no doubt about that. That was mainly because I guess I thought I had a better capacity to drive change, going back to some of those conversations we had, and I wanted to be able to get on with that. I had a scepticism – maybe it was my growing sceptical politician persona. I just began to see almost that the more politics got into something, the worse the outcomes tended to be.
I think, looking back in hindsight, I ended up thinking we should allow mayors to create their own opportunity areas, for example. Why shouldn’t mayors be able to do that with the funds and trigger their own opportunity areas? When you look at Ofsted, the regulatory environment, the big debate about school improvement and how should it be driven, for a long time, we allowed local authorities to effectively do school improvement. In my own constituency, they had a great education team. Of course, it was patchy, which goes back to capacity. In other words, what happens is you get a decision that affects everything, but part of the system is not performing. What politicians do is they do suggest the whole system’s failing when actually the system might be fine, it might be some players within it with weak capacities that aren’t succeeding. Look at recent changes, for example, on initial teacher education, where the DfE has changed everything when actually the overall system probably works relatively well, and the resource and effort from the DfE should much more have been about who are the core providers, how do we sort those out and how do we sort out provision in parts of the country that doesn’t have it. Instead, everything got changed, costing tens of millions of pounds.
Q: Education tends to be singled out as less local government friendly and devolution minded than other departments?
I think it is. I think it comes from the national curriculum mindset, doesn’t it? I think there are reasons to be cautious because you only get one shot of education. These are life directions that can be massively damaged if you say, ‘Let’s leave it to a weak local leader to run schools for 20 years’. The importance of it makes it hard to simply let go, which is why I was trying to strike this balance between allowing that local shaping of strategy, but still having that support structure of Whitehall and the Secretary of State and the resource system and DfE officials to mitigate the risks – and, of course, opportunity areas were in areas that have challenges.
Q: How do you contrast that with your experience in transport?
I think transport was inherently much more local. When you look at things like the bus networks, the trams literally, the transport journeys people did were local. Certainly, as a London MP, I remember Mayor Boris Johnson was extremely effective at coming into the DFT asking for more money, putting his case cajoling, persuading. He had a good set of officials around him that made very good policy cases. I think there was much more comfortableness on devolving. To the extent that it was often a physical investment question and therefore, once the decision was taken, other companies were delivering it. You procured it, and then it got built. It was more of a discrete investment decision that they could be easily tracked and checked. So, it’s completely different from education in that sense.
Q: Would be fair to say that Treasury was always a bit sceptical that big local transport solutions might turn out to be very expensive?
Look at the Rotherham tram-train, I was always very sceptical of that being built.
Q: And how about the current debate about HS2?
Well, there’s almost the direct question on transport strategy, and then there’s the broader question about, is part of a bigger plan on regenerating areas. I saw HS2 as a long-term plan. If we’d been looking at the Victorian train network today using the same approach, we’d never have built it. You have these net present value calculations that are designed for a question of, do I build the factory? Once you’re past 30 years, the discounting just stops working in terms of benefits. Yet we’re still getting the benefits every day of a Victorian rail system that was built 150 years ago. But if you were doing the net present value back then, you wouldn’t be getting the value today. It would discount back to zero in 1860. So, we’re not set up to evaluate such long-term strategic projects.
On HS2, the southern end of the project was always about capacity because literally the West Coast main line was full. But Covid has significantly changed the dynamics of that investment decision now. But the big benefit of it was the connectivity point for the North, the fact that you could go from London to Manchester in an hour and 10, which basically is the equivalent of everything being as far away as Surrey is to London on the train. So, if you lop that bit off, you have lopped off the strategic bit of the project and you’re left then with the more conventional capacity question, which I’m afraid post-Covid is incredibly weak by comparison to what it was. I’m reminded of the story that the brilliant Nick MacPherson told me as a Treasury minister. When the DFT first approached the Treasury about the M25, the official said, ‘But it doesn’t go anywhere’. So, you have this terrible sense that if it was the M25 today, they’d be like, you just get rid of that Borehamwood to Watford bit. If you knock out a quarter of the M25, it defeats almost the entire object of the M25. But that is precisely the equivalence decision I think that we’re about to see on HS2. We’re about to knock out the entire strategic benefit of it.
Q: You lamented the fact that politics didn’t stick with solutions long enough. Should we stick with combined authorities, and elected mayors and make them comprehensive?
I’m saying, do that as much as you can, because we know it’s a model that can work. But you have to accept that for places like Devon and Cornwall, that’s probably not going to work. They deserve a plan that’s going to work. So, the next question on devolution and regeneration is what works in those social mobility cold spot systems that just aren’t urban enough and connected enough to allow a single figurehead to pull it together and drive it. But the positive is that if you can crack that bit of it, then you do have a full strategy.
Q: Cornwall has just rejected a plan for a cross-Cornwall elected mayor.
Yes of course. Because Cornwall is a myriad of really different places that, in a sense, don’t have that common identity that, say, we’d have in London where I regularly go through all the other boroughs on my way to wherever. I think it has to work with human geography. I think we’ve ignored the human geography and tried to override it. And we’ve learned. I think you just have to accept that we’ve got to do better than just say, ‘Oh, it’s one size fits all. It’s got to work.’ It just doesn’t. Otherwise, we’d have done it by now.
Q: You talked earlier about how productivity growth process and development work has changed over the last 40 years. How does that change the way you think about the policy agenda to drive a more inclusive growth within and across regions?
Some of the work we’re doing now with employers and businesses specifically uses this framework, a version of the sustainable development goals, but for a developed country like Britain. That includes not only infrastructure challenges but also human capital challenges. I think it’s about being much more structured, that there are more aspects of the challenge to fix now. We need to have better diagnoses of the social mobility cold spot system. Look at Rotherham and I will give you another social mobility cold spot challenge, which I’ve called lesser sibling rivalry. Rotherham has all of its talent sucked out of it by Sheffield, let alone the rest of the country. You need to recognise that in itself is a little micro-system of a big city and and small conurbation. What’s the strategy for the small conurbation to kind of symbiotically coexist?
We haven’t even got into any of those sorts of levels of understanding. I think economically, the final piece of it really to flag is when you look at the talent market and more sophisticatedly understand it. I’ll refer you to the academic work on social rigidities and its connection back to growth. My point is that as you shift from a more physically driven economy to a more human, capital-driven economy, the points he made in terms of vested interests, social rigidities and how they help or hinder growth become more and more relevant, and yet they feature zero in any Treasury thinking. I had a conversation with the OBR about this just a couple of weeks ago. Until we start to factor them more formally into our analysis, we won’t really understand how those very different communities, their abilities, and their rigidities, then translates into regeneration.
Q: Compared to other countries, the evidence says that our cities are not doing well enough. If only Sheffield, the big city, could do better, that would be the best outcome for Rotherham?
Probably yes, and I think Sheffield is doing better. But Rotherham has its own specific set of quite local challenges that have not enabled it necessarily to take advantage of any growth that’s been able to happen in Sheffield.
Q: So, it’s not that Sheffield doing badly is a drag on Rotherham. Rotherham, unless it raises its game, also holds Sheffield back?
That’s almost demonstrably the case, isn’t it? It has to be a better scenario for Sheffield. If Rotherham was kicking out an amazing amount of talent and it was almost a startup centre that could hook up to some of the work in Sheffield, that obviously would be better. But I think there are a whole range of social challenges going on in my hometown that are not really about economics, but tie back to it.
Q: Some say that if you just focused your policy drive on the cities, that is the best way to help all the towns around them?
I’m saying that the causality can run both ways. People see a cause and they see an effect, and they assume a link. And what they don’t diagnose is where did the change process start? Where in the system did that happen? And so, if they misdiagnose that, then you end up with completely wrong policy solutions. The challenge in London is that we’re actually doing quite a good job of talent creation. Our schools have got better. Yet our employers aren’t open to that talent in the way they need to be.
You walk into the Treasury, it’s all very well having a Darlington economic campus, I’m very pleased about that. But what about the talent base where Treasury HQ is? The challenge in London on regeneration is an economic challenge much more than a talent challenge. The challenge in Rotherham is a talent challenge and an economic challenge. And then you’ve got other areas where Bradford is a great one, Bradford University kicking out tons of underutilised talent from a really good university. But there haven’t been the economic opportunities there. Now you’re seeing companies like PWC thinking, ‘Hang on a second, there’s a load of underutilised graduate talent. Why don’t we open up in Bradford?’ But they all require different interventions, policy-wise in order to help them lift.
The final thought I give you is the University of Lincoln. It takes over an academy in a very rural area, it does a great job and then sets up an Academy Trust. On the back of that then it thinks, there’s an economic upskilling agro-tech opportunity. So, it applies for and and sets up the National Centre for Food Manufacturing in the area over a number of years. It raises the talent levels and the skilled job levels in this one place. So, whereas before, the school was kicking out badly educated young people who went to work in a largely manual agricultural local economy, the university ended up crystallising both the talent base to shift up and also the economic base to shift up into higher skilled agricultural jobs. But there was no strategy, no one thought this was the beginning of a regeneration strategy. It’s just that the university ended up catalysing a change process that did that. Nothing to do with the local. It’s such a good example of how it was a different anchor institution to the one you might have expected that led to the change.
Q: Has London been a drag or advantage to the rest of England in terms of growth?
I think it’s an advantage. You don’t level up by dragging down successful parts of the country. The issue lifting up other parts of the country and unlocking their talent to succeed. I think it’s a false argument, and I don’t think it takes you anywhere in terms of policy. Even within London, there are deep pockets of deprivation. To characterise it as this perfect place is missing the lives that many, many people live in the capital city.
On the one hand, this tells you that London isn’t levelled up. It has huge inequality. So, it clearly proves that improving the education system, improving the transport system, isn’t enough for London. It’s more than physical infrastructure. What you learn from London is that you need a comprehensive plan because unless it includes economic regeneration, then you are not going to really use the whole of the talent.
The final thing I would say is to go back to social rigidities. London is innovating, but it’s a comparatively smaller group of people within London who are innovating compared to what it ought to be doing as a city, in my view.
Q: Looking back, what is the biggest achievement to build on and what is the biggest weakness to address?
Genuinely, my big ‘plus’ was how pleasantly surprised I was that the Opportunity Area approach worked. Devolution matched with buy-in from national government. But the thing I would take from it is we have to better identify those basic social mobility cold spots and work policy around what will work for each of those. That then starts to get you out of this one size fits all piece, and I think makes you better placed to have a meaningful discussion with local communities about the different kinds of approaches that might work for them and allow perhaps a bit more ownership on which approach, if they don’t think this one works, would work.
The frustration is hanging everything on the political system being able to drive this when actually the Lincoln and the Yeovil example tells you: in one case, it’s a university doing it, in one case it’s university. Look at Staffordshire University, 15 years ago, they were doing gaming degrees, and I’m sure, had the Daily Mail known about it, they would have said they were utter ‘Mickey Mouse’ computer game degrees. They’re now supplying a third of the programming talent to the e-gaming industry and the e-sports industry, which is one of our massive growth sectors. Had politicians been in charge of those decisions, we never would have had that. I think innovation cannot come from the political system for various reasons. That’s just a fact. We have to allow other anchor institutions on the ground to be able to get on and try and drive change themselves. There’s more capacity and willingness and understanding that they can do that now than there has been in the past. There’s more empowerment through devolution to those different institutions now than there has been in the past. Which I think is positive.
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