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Neural activity associated with self, other, and object-based counterfactual thinking

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ABSTRACT

Previous research has shown that autobiographical episodic counterfactual thinking-i.e., mental simulations 22 about alternative ways in which one's life experiences could have occurred-engages the brain's default network 23 (DN). However, it remains unknown whether or not the DN is also engaged during impersonal counterfactual 24 thoughts, specifically those involving other people or objects. The current study compares brain activity during 25 counterfactual simulations involving the self, others and objects. In addition, counterfactual thoughts involving 26 others were manipulated in terms of similarity and familiarity with the simulated characters. The results indicate 27 greater involvement of DN during person-based (i.e., self and other) as opposed to object-based counterfactual 28 simulations. However, the involvement of different regions of the DN during other-based counterfactual simula-29 tions was modulated by how close and/or similar the simulated character was perceived to be by the participant. 30 Simulations involving unfamiliar characters preferentially recruited dorsomedial prefrontal cortex. Simulations 31 involving unfamiliar similar characters, characters with whom participants identified personality traits, recruited 32 lateral temporal gyrus. Finally, our results also revealed differential coupling of right hippocampus with lateral 33 prefrontal and temporal cortex during counterfactual simulations involving familiar similar others, but with 34 left transverse temporal gyrus and medial frontal and inferior temporal gyri during counterfactual simulations 35 involving either oneself or unfamiliar dissimilar others. These results suggest that different brain mechanisms 36 are involved in the simulation of personal and impersonal counterfactual thoughts, and that the extent to 37 which regions associated with autobiographical memory are recruited during the simulation of counterfactuals 38 involving others depends on the perceived similarity and familiarity with the simulated individuals. 39

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Introduction

We spend a substantial amount of our lives entertaining mental simulations about situations beyond our temporally and spatially present surroundings.¹ Some of these situations are real but long

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¹ The notion of 'simulation' has been traditionally employed as an alternative to the so-called "'theory'-theory" in the literature on mentalizing. However, nowadays the term has acquired a wider scope, becoming essentially a shorthand to refer to the cognitive process of generating coherent imaginations involving scenes (for discussion see, Schacter et al., 2008). In a recent comprehensive volume on mental simulation, and in line with this more general definition, Markman, Klein and Suhr (2008) defined 'simulation' simply as "the act of imagination and generation of alternative realities" (p. vii). Our use of 'simulation' is consistent with this broader definition. We thank an anonymous reviewer for inviting us to clarify this issue.

gone, as when we remember specific episodes from our personal past. 49 But some of these situations are hypothetical, as when we imagine 50 ourselves in a possible future scenario-a kind of mental simulation 51 that has come to be known as episodic future thinking (Atance and 52 O'Neill, 2001; for reviews, see Schacter et al., 2012; Szpunar, 2010). 53 The last decade of research in the cognitive neuroscience of both episod- 54 ic memory and episodic future thinking has revealed striking common-55 alities between the neural mechanisms underlying both kinds of mental 56 simulations (Okuda et al., 2003; Addis et al., 2007; Hassabis et al., 57 2007b; Szpunar et al., 2007). Moreover, these studies have revealed 58 that the brain regions commonly engaged by episodic memory and 59 episodic future thinking are part of what it is now known as the brain's 60 default network (DN), a set of functionally connected brain regions in- 61 cluding ventral medial prefrontal cortex (vMPFC), posterior cingulate 62 cortex (PCC), inferior parietal lobule (IPL), lateral temporal cortex 63 (LTC), dorsal medial prefrontal cortex (dMPFC), and the hippocampal 64 formation (Buckner et al., 2008). 65

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66 Importantly, other kinds of mental simulations about hypothetical 67 scenarios have been shown to engage core regions of the DN as well. For instance, both mental navigation, or our capacity to mentally simu-68 69 late the spatial surroundings from someone's point of view (Maguire et al., 1998), and mentalizing, or our capacity to mentally simulate 70 another person's perspective (Saxe and Kanwisher, 2003; Mitchell, 09 722009), have shown to activate core regions of the DN (Spreng et al., 732009). To account for these convergent results, Buckner and Carroll 74(2007) suggested that core regions of the DN may be commonly activat-75ed during these cognitive processes because the DN plays a critical func-76tional role in the generation and support of stimulus-independent 77 simulations in which we project ourselves onto hypothetical situations.

Further support for this view comes from studies on another kind of 78 79 hypothetical thought which, up until very recently, had not received much attention in the cognitive neuroscience of mental simulation: 80 counterfactual thinking, our tendency to think about alternative 81 82 ways in which things might have occurred in the past but did not (Roese, 1997). Counterfactual thoughts play a central role in human 83 emotion and decision-making, and have been extensively studied in 84 philosophy and linguistics (Goodman, 1947; Lewis, 1973) as well as so-011 010 cial psychology and behavioral economics (Roese and Olson, 1995; 86 Mandel, Hilton and Catellani, 2005; Epstude and Roese, 2008).² Thus, 012 88 given how many of our counterfactual simulations involve projecting ourselves onto possible pasts that could have occurred but did not, it 89 is not unreasonable to hypothesize that core regions of the DN would 90 be engaged during counterfactual thinking, which also constitutes a 91kind of self-generated thought (Andrews-Hanna et al., 2014) 92

Q13 This hypothesis was recently supported by two studies (De Brigard et al., 2013a, 2013b; Van Hoeck et al., 2013) in which participants en-94gaged in episodic counterfactual thinking: counterfactual simulations 95about alternative ways in which past *personal* (i.e., self-involving) 96 97 events could have occurred but did not (De Brigard and Giovanello, 98 2012). Although both studies showed significant engagement of core regions of DN during episodic counterfactual thinking, De Brigard et al. 014 (2013a, 2013b) also found that the engagement of such regions was 100 modulated by the perceived likelihood of the counterfactual thought. 101 Specifically, they found that the more likely the counterfactual alterna-102103 tive was perceived, the greater the engagement of the DN. Of note, this effect was most clear in certain core regions of the DN, such as the 104 hippocampus and the vMPFC, which were parametrically modulated 105by perceived likelihood of the episodic counterfactual thought. 106

Why is there differential engagement of DN regions during episodic counterfactual simulations? One hypothesis is that likely episodic counterfactuals were perceived by the participants as more personally relevant for social interactions. This hypothesis is consistent with much research in the social psychology of counterfactual thinking, suggesting that our tendency to engage in episodic counterfactual

² Although related, the expression "counterfactual" as it is used in psychology does not square precisely with the way in which the notion of "counterfactual" is used in philosophy and linguistics. Philosophers and linguists tend to be interested in the semantics of counterfactual statements: that is, they seek to understand how to assign truth values to conditional statements whose antecedents are false by virtue of referring to (or, less controversially, expressing) events that are contrary-to-fact. Psychologists, on the other hand, understand "counterfactual" as a psychological term, employed in reference to the cognitive process of thinking about alternative ways in which a thought-to-be-true fact could have occurred differently. As such, it is possible for a counterfactual thought, understood psychologically, to be semantically factual. If I think "Had I left the door open, the dog wouldn't have left", because I wrongly believe that I closed the door. I am entertaining a counterfactual thought that may not qualify as a counterfactual, in the semantic sense, because the antecedent could very well be true, namely if I did, in fact, leave the door open. Moreover, early canonical uses of the term "counterfactual simulation" restricted its use to imagined alternative ways in which past events could have occurred (Kahneman and Miller, 1986; Roese, 1997; McMullen, 1997). Now, though, psychologists tend to use the term "counterfactual simulation" in a more encompassing way, referring to the process of actively constructing and maintaining a mental image or scene in which one or several known facts are altered. Our use of the term "counterfactual simulation" is consistent with this latter construal, although we are sensitive to the fact that, semantically, counterfactual simulations may best be called hypothetical (De Brigard, 2014). We thank an anonymous reviewer for inviting us to clarify this issue.

simulations may be a goal-oriented cognitive strategy to help us to 113 modify future behavior in the context of social interactions (Johnson 114 and Sherman, 1990; Markman and McMullen, 2003; Epstude and Q15 Roese, 2007). Indirect evidence in support of this hypothesis comes 116 from a recent study in which Van Hoeck et al. (2014) found significant 117 overlap in brain activation during false-belief and counterfactual tasks 118 involving possible social interactions. Critically, some of this overlap 119 occurred in temporo-parietal junction and precuneus, which have 120 been associated with the DN. However, this suggestive result only 121 speaks indirectly to the above hypothesis, as they did not employ 122 episodic counterfactual simulations based upon actual autobiographical 123 events, and did not directly manipulate the personal relevance (for the 124 participant) of the characters involved in the vignettes. 125

On the other hand, the hypothesis that involvement of the DN 126 during autobiographically-based episodic counterfactual thoughts is 127 associated with perceived personal relevance of the content of the 128 simulation for social interaction is also consistent with recent proposals 129 suggesting a critical role of the DN supporting socially relevant goal-130 oriented cognition (Andrews-Hanna, 2012; Andrews-Hanna et al., 131 2014). In line with these results, we conjecture that if the involvement 132 of core DN regions during counterfactual thinking is modulated by the 133 personal and social relevance of the simulated event, then it is likely 134 that impersonal and non-socially relevant counterfactual simulations 135 would engage processes outside of the DN, whereas personal and socially relevant episodic counterfactual simulations would mainly engage core regions in the DN. 138

To explore this general hypothesis, the current study was designed 139 to extend our understanding of the involvement of regions of the DN 140 during personal and socially relevant counterfactual simulations in 141 three ways. First, this study investigates whether or not core regions 142 of the DN are engaged during mental simulations of impersonal 143 counterfactual thoughts pertaining to either objects or people other 144 than oneself. Participants were asked to simulate counterfactuals that 145 either involved themselves, other people, or objects. Given recent 146 neuroimaging results showing significant overlap in DN regions during 147 episodic memory and theory of mind tasks (Spreng and Grady, 2010; 148 Mitchell, 2009), and greater involvement of DN during simulations 149 that involve primarily autobiographical details rather than tasks involv- 150 ing non-autobiographical processing of objects (Addis et al., 2007; Addis 151 et al., 2009; Hassabis et al., 2007a, 2007b), we expected to see greater 016 involvement of DN during person-based (i.e., self and other) relative 153 to object-based counterfactual simulations. Indeed, two recent fMRI 154 studies exploring neural correlates of semantic evaluation of non- 155 autobiographical hypothetical and counterfactual statements show rel- 156 atively little involvement of DN regions (Nieuwland, 2012; Kulakova 157 et al., 2013), further suggesting that object-based counterfactual 158 simulations may primarily recruit processes outside the DN. 159

On the other hand, given previous research showing differential 160 MPFC recruitment for self- relative to other-based mental simulations 161 (Denny et al., 2012; Hassabis et al., 2014; Wagner et al., 2012), we 162 also expected to find differences in prefrontal activation between 163 self versus other-based counterfactual simulations. Thus, a second way 164 in which the current study seeks to investigate the involvement of DN 165 in personal and socially relevant counterfactual simulations, is by 166 way of contrasting the recruitment of DN regions during personal and 167 socially relevant counterfactual simulations (i.e., objectsonal and non-socially relevant counterfactual simulations (i.e., objectbased), on the one hand, and impersonal yet socially relevant counterfactual simulations (i.e., other-based), on the other. 171

Finally, since certain DN regions recruited during theory of mind 172 tasks—e.g., MPFC, anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), and hippocampus—173 are differentially engaged depending on whether or not the simulated 174 character is personally known (i.e., familiar) and/or perceived to be175 similar in personality by the participant (Mitchell et al., 2006; Krienen 176 et al., 2010), we also expected to find neural differences when other-177 based counterfactuals involved either familiar and/or similar characters.178

Thus, personal and social relevance of counterfactual simulations was 179 manipulated in yet a third way, by asking participants to engage in 180 three other-based counterfactual simulation tasks: they either had to 181 182imagine how things could have been different for 1) a familiar/similar character, 2) an unfamiliar/similar character, or 3) an unfamiliar/ 183dissimilar character. Since research suggests greater recruitment of 184 vMPFC, posterior ACC and medial temporal lobe (MTL) for similar-185and familiar-others relative to self-based simulations (Mitchell et al., 186 187 2006; Krienen et al., 2010; Perry et al., 2011), we anticipated our results to be consistent with these reports. Furthermore, given previous results 188 189suggesting a tight functional coupling between the hippocampus and 190MPFC during mentalizing tasks involving familiar versus unfamiliar targets (Perry et al., 2011; Rabin and Rosenbaum, 2012; see also 191 192Rosenbaum et al., 2007), we conducted a functional connectivity analysis seeded in the hippocampus expecting to find a similar pattern of co-193 activation for counterfactuals involving self and familiar-others but not 194 unfamiliar-others. Therefore, a final aim of the current study is to 195 explore whether differences in neural activation during counterfactual 196 thoughts about others can be accounted for by the participant's per-197 ceived similarity and/or familiarity with the simulated characters. We 198 used spatiotemporal Partial Least Squares (PLS; Krishnan et al., 2010; 017 McIntosh et al., 1996; McIntosh et al., 2004) to analyze task-related 200 201 brain activation. In this approach, task conditions are analyzed simultaneously to detect covaring, as well as dissociable, patterns of activity. 202 This multivariate method is sensitive to distributed voxel responses 203and is thus ideally suited to analyze distributed network activity. 204

205 Methods

206 Participants

Twenty-six healthy right-handed English-speaking young adults (M age = 20.8, SD = 2.55; 11 females) with normal or corrected-tonormal vision and no history of neurological or psychiatric conditions participated in the study. All participants provided written consent in accordance with the guidelines set by the Committee on the Use of Human Subjects in Research at Harvard University and received monetary compensation.

214 Due to excessive motion, one subject was excluded leaving 25 215 participants for fMRI analysis (see below).

216 Pre-scan stimulus collection

To generate subject-specific, and therefore personally relevant 217counterfactual thoughts, a stimulus collection interview was conducted 218 one week prior to scanning. Participants were asked to report 35 mem-219220ories of specific decisions made in the past 10 years. Participants were asked to provide a title for each remembered decision, and to briefly 221state (less than 5 words) what they decided to choose. To provide 222 retrieval support, participants were provided a list of 50 common 223decisions representative of their cohort determined by pilot sampling 224225 (e.g., mixing whites and colors in the laundry; telling parents about a 226bad grade). Participants were instructed to report only event-specific 227memories-i.e., vividly detailed recollections of single experienced 228events-as opposed to lifetime period or general event memories (Conway and Pleydell-Pearce, 2000). In addition, they were asked to re-229230port only specific memories of decisions about which they felt regret by virtue of the outcome of their choice. Finally, participants were asked to 231report only specific memories of regretful decisions where the outcome 232 occurred close to having made the decision, as opposed to days or 233months later (e.g., missing an important appointment because they de-234cided to take the bus instead of the subway; getting their favorite t-shirt 235stained because they decided to mix whites with colors in the laundry). 236To facilitate adherence to the instructions, examples of specific memo-237ries of past decisions were given. At the end, participants were asked 238239 to rate the degree of regret felt after the decision from 1 ("Very little regret") to 5 ("A lot of regret"). Independently, participants were 240 given a form to complete that included some demographic information, 241 such as age and years of education. Importantly, two questions asked 242 them to report their social and political views on a Likert scale ranging 243 from 1 (Conservative) to 7 (Liberal). Following Mitchell et al. (2006), 244 these ratings were later used to pair each participant with a similar 245 and a dissimilar character. 246

Instruction session, stimuli and experimental conditions

From the reported memories, the 28 that received the highest rat- 248 ings of regret were selected as stimuli. The remaining memories were 249 used for practice during the instruction session prior to scanning. The 250 purpose of this instruction session was to explain the tasks and to famil- 251 iarize participants with the stimuli and three target characters that 252 would feature in the experimental tasks. Participants were told that all 253 stimuli had the same structure, and that they would see a screen 254 displaying a heading indicating the task, and three lines of text below 255 (Fig. 1). Then, participants received instruction on the Self condition. 256 They were informed that they would see a display with the heading 257 "Self", followed by the title of one of their reported decisions, the choice 258 they made, and a line reading "If only". Participants were instructed to 259 mentally complete the thought, "If only...", by imagining how things 260 would have been better for the person referred to in the heading 261 (i.e., themselves) in the situation referred by the title and the choice 262 (e.g., "If only I had taken the T instead of the bus this morning"; "If 263 only I had separated the whites from the colors when doing laundry 264 that one time"). They were told that the screen would be displayed for 265 12 s, and were encouraged to use the whole time to come up with a 266 very vivid counterfactual simulation. 267

Next, participants were instructed to complete a short form asking 268 them to think of a relative or close friend with whom they were very fa-269 miliar, to whom they considered themselves similar and who was of the 270 same gender and roughly their age. They were asked to briefly list the 271 reasons why they thought this person was similar and familiar to 272 them, and were asked to rate how similar and how familiar they were 273 to this person on a scale from 1 (Very dissimilar/unfamiliar) to 10 274 (Very similar/familiar). Participants were then told that in the second 275 task-the Familiar/Similar (FamSim) condition-they would see a head- 276 ing with the name of the friend or relative that they just identified 277 (e.g., "Morgan"), followed by a previously reported decision-title and 278 choice, as well as the line "If only". As with the Self condition, partici- 279 pants were instructed to mentally complete the thought "If only..." by 280 imagining how things would have been better for the person referred 281 to in the heading (i.e., Morgan) in the situation referred by the title 282 and the choice (e.g., "If only Morgan had taken the T instead of the 283 bus this morning"; "If only Morgan had separated the whites from the 284 colors when doing laundry that one time"). They were told that the 285 screen would be displayed for 12 s, and were encouraged to use the en- 286 tire time to come up with a very vivid counterfactual simulation. 287

For the third condition, participants were presented with a fictional 288 unfamiliar character designed to be similar to the participants. Two such 289 characters were designed: one female ("Cathy"), for female participants, 290 and one male ("Clark"), for male participants. These characters depicted 291 young undergraduate students in Boston, with fairly liberal social and 292 political beliefs, and with interests common among the participant's 293 population (for those participants who gave conservative ratings during 294 the pre-scan stimulus collection session, Cathy and Clark also depicted 295 young undergraduates in Boston, but with rather conservative social 296 and political beliefs). A photograph downloaded from the Internet ac- 297 companied the description. Participants were told that these characters 298 described real people and were asked to rate how similar they were to 299 this person on a scale from 1 (Very dissimilar) to 10 (Very similar). Par- 300 ticipants were then told that in the third task-the Unfamiliar/Similar 301 (UnfSim) condition-they would see a heading with the name of one 302 of these characters (i.e., "Cathy" or "Clark"), a decision title, a choice, 303

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


Fig. 1. Experimental design.

and the line "If only". As before, participants were instructed to mentally 304 complete the thought "If only ... " by imagining how things would have 305 306 been better for the person referred to in the heading (i.e., "Cathy" or "Clark") in the situation indicated by the title and the choice (e.g., "If 307 only Clark had taken the T instead of the bus this morning"; "If only 308 309 Cathy had separated the whites from the colors when doing laundry that one time"). The fourth condition-the Unfamiliar/Dissimilar 310 311 (UnfDis) condition—was parallel to the previous one, except participants were presented with fictional unfamiliar characters designed to 312 be dissimilar to participants. One female ("Susan") and one male 313 character ("Sean") were created. Each depicted individuals in their 314 315 50s, living in rural Texas, with rather conservative social and political beliefs, and with personal interests very much unlike those of the 316 common undergraduate in Boston (for those participants who gave 317 conservative ratings during the pre-scan stimulus collection session, 318 Susan and Sean also depicted individuals in their 50s, but living in 319 320 Portland and with rather liberal social and political beliefs). Photo-321 graphs also accompanied these descriptions and participants were 322 asked to rate how similar they were to this person on a scale from 1 323 (Very dissimilar) to 10 (Very similar). As before, participants were instructed to mentally complete the thought "If only..." by imagining 324 325how things would have been better for the person referred to in the heading (i.e., "Susan" or "Sean") in the situation indicated by the title 326 and the choice (e.g., "If only Susan had taken the T instead of the bus 327 this morning"; "If only Sean had separated the whites from the colors 328when doing laundry that one time"). Also as before, the screen appeared 329 330 for 12 s, and participants were encouraged to use the entire time to 331 vividly imagine the counterfactual simulation.

332 Finally, for the Object condition, participants saw the heading "Object", followed by the name of an ordinary object, one of its features, 333 and the line "If only". Participants were instructed to mentally complete 334 335 the thought "If only" by imagining how things would have been better for the object referred to in the screen if the displayed feature had 336 been different. For instance, if the object was "Skateboard" and the fea-337 ture was "Four wheels", participants were asked to imagine a change in 338 the feature that they thought would have made the object better (e.g., If 339 only the wheels could rotate in a 360 angle). As before, the screen was 340 displayed for 12 s, and participants were encouraged to use the entire 341 time to come up with a vivid counterfactual simulation. The list of 28 342 objects and their properties was chosen as follows. From the Medical 343 344 Research Council (MRC) Psycholingustic Database (Coltheart, 1981), the names of 50 common and highly imaginable concrete objects 345 were chosen, and each object was paired with its most salient property. 346 Next, a pilot norming survey with an independent sample of 20 subjects 347 was conducted, by asking them to assess how common were these 348 objects in their past, how easily mutable they found the properties to 349 be, and how easy it was to imagine a variation in the property that 350 could, in their option, make the object better. The 28 objects and the 351 properties that received the highest ranking in this pilot survey were 352 chosen for the stimuli included in the *Object* condition. 353

Following the 12 s with the slide for the counterfactual simulation, 354 participants were asked to give three ratings: 1) Could the event/object 355 have occurred/been in the way you just simulated? 2) Would the event/ 356 object have occurred/been in the way you just simulated? 3) Should the 357 event/object have occurred/been in the way you just simulated? Partic- 358 ipants were told that "could" ratings were supposed to reflect their as- 359 sessment of the plausibility of simulation regardless of the character's 360 willingness to bring about the change; "would" ratings were supposed 361 to reflect their assessment of the plausibility of the simulation given 362 their judgments on the character's willingness to bring about the 363 change; and "should" ratings were supposed to reflect their normative 364 assessment on the goodness of the simulated change. To further clarify 365 the ratings we provided examples of counterfactual events in which 366 modal judgments such as "could", "would" and "should" diverge 367 (e.g., FamSim: "I guess although Morgan could have separated colors 368 and whites, and given how much she cares about her clothes she should 369 have done it, knowing how penny-pinching she is and how much she 370 hates to do laundry she probably wouldn't have done it"; Object: 371 "Although stop signs could have been green, I am not sure they would 372 have been, and I am pretty sure they should not have been green"). All 373 ratings varied across a 5 point scale anchored at "No" and "Yes". Each 374 rating slide was displayed for 4 s, and the order was counterbalanced 375 per run (Fig. 1). 376

Scanning session

In the scanner, participants completed seven runs with 20 trials per 378 run consisting of 4 trials per condition. Since all 28 decisions and choices 379 would appear once per condition for the Self, FamSim, UnfSim, and 380 UnfDis conditions, they were pseudo-randomized so that each choice 381 and decision would appear only once per run. Each run was 10 min 382 long, and included 20 s (10 TRs) of fixation at the beginning and at 383

377

the end that were dropped during the analysis. Images were acquired 384 385on a 3 T Siemens Magnetom TimTrio Scanner, equipped with a 12-386 channel head coil. Participants' heads were held in place with cushions. 387 An initial localizer was followed by a high-resolution magnetizationprepared rapid gradient echo sequence (MPRAGE; $176 \times 1 \text{ mm sagittal}$ 388 slices, TE = 1.64 ms, TR = 2530 ms, flip angle = 7.0 deg., voxel size = 389 $1 \times 1 \times 1$ mm). Functional scans were collected during 7 runs using a 390 whole brain, 2 T^{*} gradient-echo, EPI sequence (TR = 2 s, TE = 30 ms, 391 392 FOV = 216 mm, flip angle = 80°) Interleaved slices (31×5 mm slices; 0.5 mm skip) parallel to the AC/PC plane, as identified by the T1 struc-393 394tural scan. Stimuli were projected in black letters onto a screen at the 395 head of the bore. Participants saw the screen on a mirror placed on 396 the head coil. E-Prime Software (psychology Software Tools, Inc., 397 Pittsburgh, PA) was used for stimuli presentation and to collect behavioral responses, for which participants used a five-button MR 398 compatible response box with their right hand. 399

400 Post-scan interview

Immediately following the scanning session, participants were 401 asked to complete a post scan interview. They were presented with all 402the trials they completed in the scanner, in the same order in which 403 404 they appeared on the scanner, and with the same display, and they 405 were asked to report what they thought of while in the scanner by way of completing the sentence "If only..." for each trial. Participants 406 took about 40 min to finish this post-scan interview. Participants were 407then debriefed and paid for their participation. 408

409 Data preprocessing and analysis

Analyses of variance (ANOVA) and t-tests were used to analyze 410 411 ratings and scores of the post-scan interviews. Cronbach's alpha values were calculated to verify inter-rater reliability in scoring of post-scan 412 413interview data. Functional MRI data were preprocessed using SPM8 (Wellcome Department of Cognitive Neurology, London, UK) imple-414mented in MATLAB (Mathworks, Natick, MA). Images were realigned, 415co-registered, segmented, normalized to MNI template, spatially 416 417 smoothed using a 8 mm full-with at half maximum isotropic Gaussian kernel, and re-sliced $(2 \times 2 \times 2 \text{ mm voxels})$. 418

The neuroimaging data were then analyzed in three stages with 419 spatiotemporal PLS (Krishnan et al., 2010; McIntosh et al., 1996, 018 2004). Spatiotemporal PLS is a multivariate functional neuroimaging 421 analysis tool designed to identify whole brain patterns of activity that 422 are correlated with tasks. PLS is a robustly validated (Krishnan et al., 019 2010; McIntosh et al., 1996, 2004; McIntosh and Lobaugh, 2004) and 424 425widely used analysis technique (e.g., Addis et al., 2012; Gerlach et al., 426 2011; Grady et al., 2010; Martin et al., 2011; Hassabis et al., 2014) that is sensitive to distributed voxel responses rather than to the activity of 427 individual voxels per se. PLS assesses the covariance between brain 428 voxels (BOLD signal) and the experimental design to identify a limited 429number of orthogonal components (Latent Variables, LVs) that optimal-430 431 ly relate the two. This data-driven approach is similar to independent 432 component analysis in that it determines orthogonal whole brain patterns of activity. Unlike independent component analysis, the num-433 ber of latent structures is constrained by the experimental conditions. 434435Unlike standard univariate analyses that examine the activity of any 436single voxel independently, PLS detects brain-wide systems that covary with the experimental design. 437

Activity at each time point, relative to trial onset, for each voxel is 438 averaged across trials of a given condition and normalized to activity 439in the first TR of the trial and the data matrix is then expressed as 440 voxel-by-voxel deviation from the grand mean across the entire exper-441 iment. This matrix is then analyzed with singular value decomposition 442 to derive the optimal effects in the data. Here, we applied PLS analysis 443 to event-related fMRI data and the results provide a set of brain regions 444 445wherein activity is reliably related to the task conditions at 12 poststimulus time points (i.e., 12 TRs = 24 s) for each LV. Each brain voxel 446 is given a singular value weight, known as a salience (akin to a compo- 447 nent loading in principle components analysis), which is proportional to 448 the covariance of activity with the task contrast at each time point on 449 each LV. Multiplying the salience by the BOLD signal value in that 450 voxel and summing the product across all voxels gives a "brain score" 451 for each participant for each time point on a given LV (like a component 452 score in principal components analysis). These brain scores can be used 453 to examine differences in brain activity across conditions, as greater 454 activity in brain areas with positive (or negative) weights on a latent 455 variable will yield positive (or negative) mean scores for a given condi- 456 tion over each time point. The significance of each LV as a whole is de- 457 termined by permutation testing, using 500 permutations. In a second, 458 independent step, the reliability of the saliences for the brain voxels 459 across subjects, characterizing each pattern identified by a LV, is deter- 460 mined by bootstrap resampling, using 300 iterations, to estimate the 461 standard errors for each voxel. Clusters larger than 100 mm³ comprising 462 voxels with a ratio of the salience to the bootstrap standard error values 463 (i.e., the "bootstrap ratio"; BSR) greater than 3.2 (p < .00024) were 464 reported. The local maximum for each cluster was defined as the 465 voxel with a BSR higher than any other voxel in a 2-cm cube centered 466 on that voxel. PLS identifies whole brain patterns of activity in a single 467 analytic step, thus, no correction for multiple comparisons is required. 468

In the first PLS analysis, a data-driven "mean-centered" approach 469 was taken to examine the maximal effects across conditions. In a second 470 analysis, we conducted a "non-rotated" analysis to specifically assess 471 person-based counterfactual conditions, and contrasted Self versus 472 FamSim, UnfSim and UnfDis. The Object condition was not included in 473 this analysis. As such, activity from trials in the Self condition was 474 weighted against trials from each one of the other three person-based 475 conditions, with the other two person-based conditions weighted as 0. 476 For this analysis only participants for whom the self-other manipulation 477 was clearly successful were included. That is, we excluded participants 478 who, contrary to the experimental objective of the current study, 479 provided only moderate endorsements of similarity with the characters 480 in the UnfSim condition and only moderate endorsements of dissimilar- 481 ity with the characters in the UnfDis condition (see behavioral results 482 below for further details). Thus, data from only those participants 483 who gave extreme ratings of similarity to the characters (1, 2, or 3 and 484 8, 9 or 10) were included in the analyses (N = 18). 485

In the final PLS analysis, we tested the hypothesis that the hippo-486 campus and the MPFC may be differentially coupled during tasks 487 involving counterfactual simulations for familiar versus unfamiliar char-488 acters. To do so, we conducted a task-related functional connectivity 489 analysis using seed PLS (McIntosh, 1999; Burianova et al., 2010; Q20 Krishnan et al., 2010). Seed PLS is a multivariate task-related functional Q21 connectivity analysis technique used to investigate the relationship be-492 tween the activity of a seed region and the activity in the rest of the 493 brain (McIntosh, 1999). Using right hippocampus as a seed, we assessed Q22 the task-related functional connectivity of this region with the rest of 495 the brain during Self, FamSim, UnfSim and UnfDis over the simulation 496 interval (first 6 TRs). BOLD signal values from right hippocampus-497

Table 1	t1.1
Behavioral results. Left: percentage of counterfactual modifications of "choice", "situation"	t1.2
and "other" during post-scan interview (N = 17). Right: Mean ratings collected online in	t1.3
the scanner ($N = 26$). Numbers in parenthesis indicate standard deviations.	t1.4

Condition	Modification			Modification Rating					
	Choice	Situation	Other	Could	Should	Would			
Self	93.49%	6.23%	0.28%	4.75 (0.29)	4.22 (0.70)	3.19 (0.85)			
Fam_Sim	83.12%	15.76%	0.98%	4.49 (0.46)	3.85 (0.68)	3.45 (0.65)			
Unf_Sim	82.07%	17.23%	0.70%	4.50 (0.47)	3.95 (0.67)	3.56 (0.49)			
Unf_Dis	76.54%	21.71%	1.75%	4.28 (0.63)	3.65 (0.82)	3.28 (0.58)			
Object	0.07%	96.29%	3.54%	4.04 (0.65)	2.57 (0.65)	2.62 (0.71)			

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


Fig. 2. Results from mean-centered PLS analysis: Latent Variable 1 (LV 1). (A) Plot of brain scores with confidence intervals. (B) Plot of temporal brain scores indicating weighed average of activation across all voxels in all participants during the length of the task. (C) Regions with negative saliences (blue) were engaged by person-based counterfactuals, whereas regions with positive saliences (red) were engaged by object-based counterfactuals. All regions are shown at a threshold of p < .001.

centered on the peak activation voxel of hippocampal activity 498 associated with person-based counterfactuals, as revealed by the 499mean-centered analysis above (LV1; MNI x,y,z = 34-16-18)—and its 50026 adjacent voxels were extracted and averaged from TR 4 after 501stimulus onset.³ Seed values were correlated with activity in all brain 502voxels, across participants. This matrix was then analyzed with singular 503value decomposition, assessed for statistical significance by permuta-504tion testing, and for reliability by bootstrap resampling, as described 505506 above

507 Results

508 Behavioral results

During the stimulus collection interview, on average participants 509rated their political (M = 4.84, SD = 1.11) and social (M = 5.52, 510SD = 1.29) views as slightly liberal. There was no significant difference 511between these ratings (p > .05) and both were strongly correlated (r =512.61). During the instruction session, participants rated the characters in 513the FamSim (M = 8.28, SD = .98) and the UnfSim conditions (M = 6.84, 514SD = .90) as more similar to them than the characters in the UnfDis 515condition (M = 2.16, SD = 1.10; smallest t(48) = 16.4, p < .001). 516517However, characters in the FamSim condition were deemed more similar than those in the UnfSim condition (t(48) = 5.42, p < .005). (This 518difference was reduced, but not eliminated (t(34) = 3.89, p < 01), for 519participants in the non-rotated analysis, whose ratings of similarity 520were on average slightly higher (M = 7.28; SD = 67) for the UnfSim.) 521

The behavioral results collected during the scanning session can be found in Table 1. Average Ratings were analyzed using a 3 (Judgment: Could, Should, Would) × 5 (Condition: Self, FamSim, UnfSim, UnfDis, Object) repeated measures ANOVA, which revealed main effects of Judgment (F(2, 24) = 58.81, p < .001, $\eta^2 = .831$) and Condition (F(4, 22) = 25.70, p < .001, $\eta^2 = .82$) qualified by a Judgment by Condition interaction (F(8, 18) = 3.10, p < .05, $\eta^2 = .58$). Direct comparisons showed that ratings for "Could" were significantly higher 529 than those of "Should" and "Would" across all conditions (largest 530 p < .005, corrected), which indicates that participants complied with 531 the task, as they were asked to imagine plausible counterfactuals. As 532 for differences between conditions, "Could" judgments for self-based 533 counterfactuals received higher ratings than for other-based counter- 534 factuals (largest p < .01, corrected), and all in turn received higher 535 ratings that object-based counterfactuals (largest p < .01, corrected). 536 However, there were no differences among FamSim, UnfSim, and 537 UnfDis (p > .05). "Should" judgments were significantly higher for Self 538 and UnfDis (p < .01, corrected) and Object (p < .001). Finally, "Would" 539 judgments were significantly different for person-based and object 540 based counterfactuals (largest p < .001), but not among person-based 541 counterfactuals. Sate

Seventeen participants completed post-scan interviews,⁴ which 543 were scored following Girotto et al.'s (2007) approach. Counterfactuals 544 that undid features of the protagonist's choice (e.g., "If Cathy had chosen 545 a different meal") were coded as "choice" modifications. Counterfac- 546 tuals that undid features of the situation (e.g., "If there had been more 547 options on the menu") were coded as "situation" modifications. The 548 remaining counterfactuals were coded as "other". Across conditions 549 inter-rater reliability was good (lowest Cronbach's α = .93). A 5 (Condi- 550 tion: Self, FamSim, UnfSim, UnfDis, Object) \times 3 (Modification: Choice, 551 Situation, Other) repeated measures ANOVA revealed a main effect of 552 Modification (*F*(2, 15) = 2478.39, *p* < .001, η^2 = .997) with a significant 553 Modification by Condition interaction ($F(8, 9) = 331.41, p < .001, \eta^2 = .554$.997). Overall, person-based counterfactuals modified features of the 555 choice, whereas object-based counterfactuals modified features of the 556 situation (p < .001, corrected). Given that objects do not really have 557 choices, this result supports the expectation that essentially all object- 558 based modifications would be coded as modifications of the situation. 559 Within person-based counterfactuals, participants modified more 560 features of the choice for Self-based counterfactuals relative to counter- 561 factuals involving unfamiliar dissimilar characters (p < .05, corrected). 562 No other effects were apparent. 563

³ This step—which is tantamount to the use of a spherical ROI in SPM—centers in the peak voxel and selects a cube around all of the voxels in its neighborhood, i.e., all of the voxels directly adjacent to the peak voxel.

⁴ Since the post-scan interview took about 1 h after an already long scanning session, many participants opted out, leaving only 17 completed interviews.

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Table 2a t2.1

t2.2 Regions associated with object versus person-centered counterfactuals (LV 1). Note: All activations reported survived a threshold of p < .0002 (BSR = 3.2), with a cluster size > 10. BA = approximate Brodmann area. L = Left; R = Right. *The bootstrap ratio (BSR) is the parameter estimate for that voxel over its standard error. It is proportional to a z score. t2.3

t2.4					MNI coordin	ates		
t2.5	Region of activation	Hemisphere	BA	Voxels	х	Y	Z	BSR*
t2.6	TR 3 (4–6 s after stimulus onset)							
t2.7	Inferior parietal lobule	L-R	40	160	44	-36	44	5.0526
t2.8	Inf. temporal/sup. occipital	L	19	59	-46	-56	-8	4.4147
t2.9	Middle frontal gyrus	R	9	37	38	48	34	4.2102
t2.10	Middle frontal gyrus	L	46	27	-50	46	10	4.0837
t2.11	Postcentral gyrus	R	1	40	36	- 38	70	3.9205
t2.12	Inferior frontal gyrus	R	47	36	36	24	-10	3.8221
t2.13	TD 4 (C. 0 from the second)							
t2.14	TR 4 (6–8 s after stimulus onset)	T	10	405	50	60	10	6 6000
t2.15	Middle occipital gyrus	L	19	485	-50	-60	-10	6.6009
t2.16	Middle frontal gyrus	L	6	390	-24	6	50	6.4317
t2.17	Middle frontal gyrus	L	46	458	-46	34	18	5.7596
t2.18	Inferior frontal gyrus	L-R	44	231	-48	8	24	5.7297
t2.19	Inferior parietal lobule	L-R	40	560	-60	-32	36	5.4495
t2.20	Inferior frontal gyrus	L-R	47	107	32	24	-8	5.3401
t2.21	Inferior frontal gyrus	R	10	222	50	46	0	5.2602
t2.22	Fusiform gyrus	L	20	58	- 30	- 36	-20	5.0943
t2.23	Insula	L-R	13	64	-42	-2	-4	4.6021
t2.24	Parahippocampal gyrus	L	35	26	-32	-24	-24	4.3676
t2.25	Middle temporal gyrus	R	37	21	54	- 56	-4	3.9002
t2.26 t2.27	TR 5 (8–10 s after stimulus onset)							
t2.21	Inferior frontal gyrus	L-R	46	931	-46	34	16	8.4174
t2.29	Middle frontal gyrus	L	6	620	-24	6	54	8.4078
t2.30	Middle/superior occipital gyrus	L	19	924	-50	-62	-10	7.7207
t2.31	Inferior frontal gyrus	L-R	9	497	-50	8	26	7.6433
t2.32	Inferior parietal lobule	L-R	40	926	-60	- 30	38	6.982
t2.33	Inferior temporal gyrus	R	37	361	56	-54	-6	5.7416
t2.34	Fusiform gyrus	L-R	37	90	- 30	- 36	-16	4.6959
t2.34 t2.35	Angular gyrus	R	39	20	48	- 78	30	4.5254
t2.36	Parahippocampal gyrus	L	36	47	- 32	-26	-28	4.4103
t2.30	Insula	L–R	13	53	-40	-2	-6	4.3383
t2.37	Superior parietal	L	7	22	-10	- 66	54	4.0527
t2.39	Middle frontal gyrus	L	11	17	-34	36	-12	3.8869
t2.33	Wildele Hontal gyrus	L		17	54	50	12	5.0005
t2.41	TR 6 (10–12 s after stimulus onset)							
t2.42	Middle temporal gyrus	L-R	37	2717	-51	-64	7	9.187
t2.43	Inferior parietal	L-R	40	3292	- 57	-27	35	8.5406
t2.44	Inferior frontal gyrus	L-R	45/46	995	-50	37	7	995
t2.45	Inferior frontal gyrus	R	9	388	61	15	27	5.9657
t2.46	Insula	L	13	289	-42	-2	-3	5.6149
t2.47	Superior parietal	R	7	130	12	- 55	56	4.5479
t2.48	Parahippocampal gyrus	L	19	228	- 30	-43	-5	4.2567
t2.49	Middle frontal gyrus	L-R	11	27	- 32	38	-14	3.9525

fMRI results 564

Mean-centered PLS analysis 565

566 The first analysis showed that brain regions engaged during personbased counterfactual simulations [Self + FamSim + UnfSim + UnfDis] 567were dissociated from those engaged during object-based counterfactu-568 al simulations, as revealed by the identification of a significant latent 569variable (LV1, p < .0001, accounting for 69.19% of the crossblock covari-570571ance, Fig. 2A). During the window of maximal neural differentiation (TR 5723–5, Fig. 2B) only two regions associated with the DN were engaged during object-based counterfactual simulations: inferior parietal lobule 573(IPL; BA 40) and inferior frontal gyrus toward the rostropolar cortex (BA 5749/10). In contrast, the set of activated regions engaged by person-based 575576 counterfactuals during this time window included all of the regions previously associated with the DN: vMPFC and ACC (including BA 24, 577 posterior, medial and rostral aspects of BA 10, and BA 32), posterior 578 cingulate/retrosplenial cortex (BA 23/31), IPL toward superior temporal 579and supramarginal gyrus (BA 39/40), lateral temporal cortex at the 580middle temporal gyrus (BA 21), dMPFC (BA 24, BA 9/10, BA 32), and 581right hippocampus. Finally, object-based counterfactuals engaged left 582parahippocampal gyrus whereas person-based based counterfactuals 583engaged right parahippocampal gyrus. (Fig. 2C. For a complete list of 584585 brain regions associated with LV1 see Tables 2a-2b).

Non-rotated PLS analysis

The results of this second analysis revealed that although person-587 based counterfactual simulations engaged core areas of the brain's DN, 588 certain regions were preferentially recruited depending on whether 589 the counterfactual involved oneself, an unfamiliar yet similar other, or 590 an unfamiliar and dissimilar other. Specifically, as revealed by the 591 identification of a significant latent variable (LV 2, p < .018, 38.62% 592 crossblock, see Fig. 3A) the contrast Self > UnfSim revealed preferential 593 recruitment of ACC (BA 32, BA 24), vmPFC (BA 10), IPL toward the 594 supramarginal gyrus (BA 40) and right hippocampus. In contrast, 595 UnfSim > Self revealed greater involvement of lateral middle and supe- 596 rior temporal gyri (BA 21; BA 22) as well as dorsal and lateral aspects of 597 the MPFC (BA 10, BA 9, see Fig. 3C. For a complete list of brain regions 598 associated with LV 2 see Tables 3a-3b). 599

The contrast Self > UnfDis also showed preferential recruitment 600 of ACC (BA 32; BA 24), vMPFC (BA 10), IPL (BA 40) and right hippocam- 601 pus, as revealed by the identification of a second significant latent 602 variable (LV 3, p < .028, 35.74% crossblock, see Fig. 3B). In contrast, 603 UnfDis > Self revealed greater involvement of lateral temporal cortices 604 (BA 20; BA 21; BA 22) as well as dorso-lateral MPFC, both right 605 (BA 9) and left (BA 9). This contrast also revealed greater involvement 606 of bilateral fusiform (BA 20) and parahippocampal gyri (BA 36; see 607 Fig. 3C. For a complete list of brain regions associated with LV 3 see 608

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t Q1 Table 2b

t3.2 Regions associated with person versus object-centered counterfactuals (LV 1).

3					MNI coordinates			
.4	Region of activation	Hemisphere	BA	Voxels	Х	Y	Z	BSR*
5	TR 3 (4–6 s after stimulus onset)							
.6	Lingual gyrus	L	18	964	-14	-82	-12	-6.156
7	Cuneus	R	17	574	14	-90	6	-6.0214
8	Fusiform gyrus	L	20	70	-42	-26	-16	-5.8435
9	Middle frontal gyrus	L	11	503	-20	38	-6	-5.7647
10	Caudate	L		104	-24	-20	30	-5.2151
11	Cingulate gyrus	R	31	25	20	-48	30	- 5.0058
12	Anterior cingulate	R	32	196	16	30	-8	-4.9764
13	Middle frontal gyrus	L	8	158	-20	32	44	-4.845
4	Superior frontal gyrus	L–R	9	188	-12	50	26	-4.679
14	Midde frontal/precentral gyrus	L-K	6/9	42	-38	2	50	-4.178
16	Precuneus	L	7	42 74	-38	-58	38	-4.060
	Inferior frontal gyrus	R	11	16	10	- 38 40	-16	-3.860
17		R	35	14	10	-26	-16 -16	- 3.695
8	Parahippocampal gyrus	ĸ	30	14	18	-26	-16	- 3.095
19 20	TR 4 (6–8 s after stimulus onset)							
21	Middle occipital gyrus	L	18	1154	-14	-90	14	-11.049
22	Medial frontal gyrus	R	11	4814	6	48	-12	-8.363
23	Superior temporal gyrus	R–L	39	926	54	-56	24	-7.312
24	Middle temporal gyrus	L	21	719	-50	-10	-16	-7.050
25	Middle frontal gyrus	L-R	8	634	-44	10	46	-6.198
6	Middle frontal gyrus	R	9	253	22	36	42	- 5.323
7	Postcentral gyrus	R–L	3	23	30	-28	40	-5.133
8	Insula	L-R	13	26	-42	-24	26	-4.901
9	Middle frontal gyrus	R	10	65	34	54	0	-4.887
30	Cingulate gyrus	L	23	173	0	-16	30	-4.862
31	Hippocampus	R	23	24	34	-16	-18	-4.566
2	Superior Temporal gyrus	R	41	14	40	-40	6	-4.566
3	Parahippocampal gyrus	R	36	100	40	-30	-10	-4.414
13 14	Parahippocampal gyrus	R	30	12	16	-42	6	-3.763
5 6		ĸ	50	12	10	-42	0	- 5.705
	TR 5 (8–10 s after stimulus onset)							
37	Cuneus	L	18	6133	-16	-86	12	-10.449
8	Middle frontal gyrus	R	8	1232	22	36	44	-8.335
9	Medial frontal gyrus	L	11	9190	-6	44	-12	-8.258
10	Supramarginal gyrus	R	40	3715	54	-54	26	-6.769
11	Insula	L	13	1121	-40	-24	26	-6.510
2	Precentral gyrus	R-L	6	296	22	-18	52	- 5.925
13	Superior temporal gyrus	L-R	38	40	- 38	24	-24	- 5.655
14	Postcentral gyrus	R	3	168	50	-16	22	-5.582
5	Inferior frontal gyrus	R–L	47	36	34	28	-22	-4.843
6	Putamen	R		180	24	8	12	- 5.357
7	Cingulate gyrus	L	24	34	-24	-20	46	-4.169
8	Superior frontal gyrus	L	8	11	-28	26	58	-3.662
19	TR 6 (10–12 s after stimulus onset)							
0	Cuneus	R	17	3648	14	- 85	8	-6.501
1								
2	Posterior cingulate	L	31	1609	-4	- 55	25	-6.299
3	Anterior cingulate	L-R	32	666	-16	41	-4	- 5.654
4	Superior frontal gyrus	L-R	8	87	16	45	11	-5.376
5	Supramarginal gyrus	R	40	493	57	-53	27	-4.868
56	Superior temporal gyrus	L	39	62	-46	-57	27	-4.397
57	Medial frontal gyrus	L	6	27	-16	31	35	-4.063

Tables 4a–4b). Finally, there were no significant results for the contrastSelf versus FamSim.

611 Seed PLS analysis

This analysis resulted in two differentiated patterns of task-related 612 functional connectivity between the right hippocampal seed and 613 correlated brain regions, as revealed by the identification of LV 4 614 (p < .034, 40.28% crossblock, see Fig. 4A). One pattern of functional 615 connectivity, identified only for the FamSim condition, revealed a signif-616 icant correlation between the hippocampal seed and lateral temporal 617 gyrus (BA 21/22), bilateral superior frontal gyrus (BA 8), right inferior 618 frontal gurys (BA 46), left IPL (BA 40), and bilateral lingual gyrus 619 (BA 18/19). A second pattern of functional connectivity, associated 620 with the Self and the UnfDis conditions, revealed a significant correla-621 tion between the right hippocampal seed and left transverse temporal 622 623 gyrus (BA 41), ventral aspects of the superior (BA 10) and medial frontal gyrus (BA 6), and bilateral inferior and middle temporal gyri (BA 19/37; 624 BA 21), among other regions (see Fig. 4B. For a complete list of brain 625 regions associated with LV 4 see Tables 5a–5b). 626

Discussion

Counterfactual thinking is a critical psychological capacity that 628 enables us to simulate alternative ways things could have been by 629 flexibly manipulating stored knowledge (see footnote 2 above). Here 630 we examined the neural basis of self, other and object-based counterfactual thinking. First, we observed that there are different patterns of 632 brain activation during person-based (whether involving oneself or 633 other people) relative to object-based counterfactual simulations. 634 Moreover, this analysis showed that person-based counterfactual simulations engaged all of the core regions associated with the DN (Buckner 636

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


Fig. 3. Results from non-rotated PLS analysis: Latent Variables 2 and 3 (LV 2, LV 3). (A) Plot of brain scores with confidence intervals and temporal brain scores for the contrast Self > UnfSim from LV 2 (B) Plot of brain scores with confidence intervals and temporal brain scores for the contrast Self > UnfDis from LV 3. (C) Regions in blue were preferentially associated with Self, those in red were preferentially associated with UnfSim, and those in green were preferentially associated with UnfDis. All regions are shown at a threshold of p < .001.

et al., 2008), whereas object-based counterfactual simulations onlyrecruited lateral aspects of two such regions (i.e., IPL and iFG).

These results add to a growing body of evidence suggesting that or-639 dinary occurrences of self-generated thoughts, of which counterfactual 640 simulations form a large subset (Roese and Olson, 1995; Epstude and 641 642 Roese, 2008; Markman et al., 2009), are supported by the activity of the brain's DN (Andrews-Hanna, 2012; Andrews-Hanna et al., 2014). 643 However, our results also help to qualify this hypothesis by showing 644 645 that not all self-generated counterfactual thoughts engage the DN to the same degree, as core regions of the DN were only associated with 646 647 the generation of counterfactual thoughts involving people rather than objects. This difference may be due to the fact that DN activity 648 has been primarily associated with personally and/or socially relevant 649 self-generated thoughts (Andrews-Hanna et al., 2014). Thinking about 650 alternative forms for inanimate objects does not have the same kind of 651 652 personal and/or social relevance as thoughts about alternative ways in 653 which person-based events could have occurred.

A related hypothesis, put forth by Buckner and Carroll (2007), 654suggests that the brain's DN is preferentially recruited during cognitive 655 tasks that require self-projection. However, the results of our first 656 analysis speak against this hypothesis, as all core areas of the DN were 657 recruited during mental simulations that did not require projecting 658 oneself but rather projecting others onto counterfactual scenarios. This 659 claim is also consistent with recent studies showing common recruit-660 ment of core regions of the brain's DN during counterfactual and theory 661 of mind tasks that are other-rather than self-centered (Van Hoeck et al., 662 2014). Nonetheless, it is important to acknowledge that although our 663 experimental design tried to keep constant the autobiographical com-664 ponent of the simulations, by asking participants to imagine alternative 665 666 ways in which situations could have unfolded during events for which participants had autobiographical knowledge, it is possible that the 667 use of autobiographical information to construct a mental simulation 668 is sufficient to engage the DN. 669

Reduced activation of DN regions during object- versus person- 670 based counterfactual simulations is consistent with findings in 671 sentence-comprehension tasks involving counterfactual statements, 672 which tend to recruit processes outside of DN (Nieuwland, 2012). Inter- 673 estingly, Kulakova et al. (2013) found involvement of one core DN re- 674 gion (right cuneus) with an activation peak that was almost identical 675 to our finding in LV1 for the person-based > object-based contrast. In 676 their study, Kulakova and collaborators had participants semantically 677 evaluate hypothetical and counterfactual sentences presented either 678 visually or aurally. They found that independent of the modality of 679 presentation, right cuneus was more active during sentence compre- 680 hension of counterfactual relative to hypothetical statements. Although 681 they admonish not to rule out the possibility that such activation may 682 simply reflect linguistic processing, Kulakova et al. do suggest that the 683 activation in cuneus may be related to scene construction that could 684 have occurred during sentence comprehension (referencing Hassabis Q23 et al., 2007a, 2007b). This interpretation is also consistent with our find- 686 ings, as object-based simulations actively precluded scene construction, 687 while person-based counterfactual simulations were likely to require 688 the construction and maintenance of complex visual scenes. 689

Second, we examined whether there are significant differences in 690 the recruitment of DN regions during self- relative to other-based 691 counterfactual thoughts. Since a number of previous results suggested 692 such differential recruitment (Denny et al., 2012; Wagner et al., 2012), 693 we hypothesized that different patterns of brain activation within the 694 DN would emerge depending on whether the counterfactual simulation 695 involved a familiar and/or a dissimilar character. This hypothesis was 696

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t4.1 Table 3a

Regions associated with counterfactual simulations for self versus unfamiliar similar characters (contrast Self > UnfSim; LV 2). Note: All activations reported survived a threshold
 of p < .0002 (BSR = 3.2), with a cluster size > 10. BA = approximate Brodmann area. L = Left; R = Right. *The bootstrap ratio (BSR) is the parameter estimate for that voxel over its
 standard error. It is proportional to a z score.

t4.5					MNI coordinates			
t4.6	Region of activation	Hemisphere	BA	Voxels	х	Y	Z	BSR*
t4.7	TR 2 (2–4 s after stimulus onset)							
t4.8	Thalamus	R		24	6	-24	16	5.0434
t4.9	Insula	L	13	17	- 34	-46	12	5.0022
t4.10	Cuneus	R	30	24	28	-76	4	4.8008
t4.11	Cerebellum	R–L		12	16	- 88	- 30	4.1521
t4.12	Caudate	L		11	- 32	- 36	4	4.0698
t4.13	Inferior frontal gyrus	R	47	10	48	44	-14	3.8596
t4.14 t4.15	TR 3 (4–6 s after stimulus onset)						1.	
t4.15 t4.16	Caudate	R		22	36	-18	-14	5.2110
t4.10 t4.17	Caudate	K		22	50	- 10	- 14	5.2110
t4.18	TR 4 (6–8 s after stimulus onset)							
t4.19	Superior frontal gyrus	R	6	10	12	- 16	78	4.3748
t4.20	Anterior cingulate	R	32	15	16	38	8	3.8885
t4.21	Middle temporal gyrus	R	37	11	58	-68	2	3.8080
t4.22 t4.23	TR 5 (8–10 s after stimulus onset)							
t4.23 t4.24	Midde frontal gyrus	R	47	90	56	40	-2	4.6608
t4.24 t4.25	Anterior cingulate	R	32	51	16	36	8	4.5010
t4.25 t4.26	Middle temporal gyrus	R	21	11	72	-24	-8	4.4932
t4.20 t4.27	Medial frontal gyrus	I	10	134	-10^{12}	38	-4	4.1791
t4.27	Cerebellum	I	10	30	-14	-40	-14	4.1601
t4.29	Anterior cingulate	L	10	29	-8	52	2	3.9347
t4.30	Inferior parietal/supramarginal	Ĩ.	40	65	- 50	-60	34	3.8954
t4.31	Hippocampus	R	10	17	28	-14	-18	3.6760
t4.32	* * *							
t4.33	TR 6 (10–12 s after stimulus onset)							
t4.34	Anterior cingulate	L	10	107	-12	52	2	5.0406
t4.35	Anterior cingulate	L	24	185	-2	36	6	4.5184
t4.36	Middle frontal gyrus	L	9	11	-30	28	36	3.9999
t4.37	Precuneus	L	19	13	-40	- 78	36	3.9580

confirmed when we contrasted self-based against other-based counter-factual simulations.

A region that showed preferential recruitment during self-based as 699 700 opposed to other-based counterfactual simulation was rostral ACC. This result replicates those obtained by Krienen et al. (2010), who found ac-701 tivity in the rACC to be reliably greater for simulations involving oneself 702 relative to strangers, even when the strangers were perceived as being 703 similar by the subject. It is important to note that ACC has been previous-704 705 ly associated with feelings of regret, which normally accompany upward 706 counterfactuals (i.e., imagining better outcomes for past decisions or 707 events). Since we employed upward counterfactuals in the current 708 study, it is possible that at least part of this increased activation in rACC is accounted for by the regret producing nature of the counterfactual 709 710 simulation. Although this is certainly a possibility, Canessa et al. (2009) compared brain activation between self-based and other-based counter-711 factual simulations using a regret-producing task and found equal 712 engagement of rACC between conditions. This finding suggests that the 713 increase in rACC activity found in the current study during self-based rel-714 715 ative to other-based counterfactual simulation cannot be fully accounted 716 by regret. However, further research is needed to determine the extent to which this increase in rACC activity is due to the self-referential nature 717 718 of the counterfactual simulation above and beyond regret.

Anterior right hippocampus was also recruited during self relative to 719 720other-based counterfactual simulations. This result dovetails with recent evidence associating hippocampal activation with the construc-721 tion of mental simulations involving self-projection on to imagined 722 scenarios in the possible future (Addis et al., 2007; Gaesser et al., 723 2013; Hassabis et al., 2007a, 2007b; Addis and Schacter, 2012; 024 Schacter et al., 2012) as well as actual (Squire, 1992; Tulving, 1985) 725and possible pasts (Addis et al., 2009; De Brigard et al., 2013a, 2013b; 025 De Brigard and Giovanello, 2012; Van Hoeck et al., 2013). 727

We next examined differential recruitment of DN regions as a function of how similar and/or familiar participant's perceived the simulated characters to be (Mitchell et al., 2006; Krienen et al., 2010). Recruitment 730 of the MPFC is modulated by the participant's familiarity with the char-731 acter featured in their counterfactual simulations. As noted, self-based 732 counterfactual simulations preferentially recruited the ventral aspect 733 of the MPFC, a region that has been consistently reported as showing 734 greater involvement during internally-generated simulations that are 735 self-referential (D'Argembeau et al., 2007; Denny et al., 2012; Wagner 736 et al., 2012). In contrast, lateral and dorsal aspects of the MPFC were 737 preferentially recruited during mental simulations of counterfactual 738 thoughts involving unfamiliar characters regardless of their perceived 739 similarity. These results are consistent with a recent proposal by 740 Krienen et al. (2010) according to which regions of the PFC along the 741 midline are sensitive to mental simulations involving characters that 742 are perceived as personally relevant and socially close rather than 743 merely similar to oneself. 744

Unlike self-based counterfactual simulations, those involving 745 unfamiliar characters preferentially recruited lateral aspects of the su-746 perior temporal gyrus. This result is consistent with the suggestion 747 that lateral regions of the superior temporal gyrus may enable the 748 retrieval of semantic and conceptual knowledge during the construction 749 of self-generated mental simulations (Andrews-Hanna et al., 2014; 750 Spreng and Grady, 2010). Given the lack of episodic information about 751 unfamiliar characters-regardless of the degree of perceived similarity 752 -participants may have latched onto general and stereotypical seman-753 tic and conceptual information about the simulated characters in order 754 to generate their counterfactual simulations. This view agrees with the 755 recent semantic scaffolding hypothesis, according to which information 756 from semantic memory facilitates the construction of mental simula-757 tions by providing a conceptual scaffold or structure into which to inte-758 grate further episodic details (Greenberg and Verfaellie, 2010; Irish 759 et al., 2012; for a related proposal see Ranganath and Ritchey, 2012). 760 By contrast, self-based counterfactual simulations may comparatively 761 require less semantic scaffolding, as the main components of such 762

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t Q2 Table 3b

t5.2 Regions associated with counterfactual simulations for self versus unfamiliar similar characters (contrast UnfSim > Self; LV 2).

t5.3					MNI coordinates				
t5.4	Region of activation	Hemisphere	BA	Voxels	х	Y	Z	BSR*	
t5.5	TR 2 (2–4 s after stimulus onset)								
t5.6	Medial frontal gyrus	L	6	103	0	28	40	- 5.8197	
t5.7	Precentral gyrus	L	43	48	- 56	-12	12	-5.1224	
t5.8	Middle temporal gyrus	L	21	16	-60	-60	0	-4.9599	
t5.9	Cerebellum	L		28	-32	-74	-40	-4.7568	
t5.10	Inferior frontal gyrus	L	47	26	-30	28	-2	-4.7047	
t5.11	Middle occipital gyrus	L	19	27	-46	-80	12	-4.6413	
t5.12	Middle frontal gryus	L-R	10	39	-38	38	28	-4.4662	
t5.13	Superior parietal gyrus	R	7	12	36	-76	46	-4.2154	
t5.14	Superior temporal gyrus	R–L	38	10	52	16	-22	-4.1903	
t5.15	Precuenus	R–L	7/19	23	38	-78	36	-3.9878	
t5.16	Postcentral gyrus	R	3	10	36	-34	48	-3.8161	
t5.17 t5.18	TR 3 (4–6 s after stimulus onset)								
t5.19	Superior parietal lobule	R–L	7	11	32	-80	46	-5.2946	
t5.20	Postcentral gyrus	R	2	43	62	-26	50	-4.9791	
t5.21	Middle frontal gyrus	R	9	15	54	30	34	-4.1390	
t5.22	Precentral gyrus	R	43	10	50	-10	14	- 3.8734	
t5.23	Middle frontal gyrus	L	10	25	-40	44	24	-3.8263	
t5.24	Superior temporal gyrus	L	13	12	-42	-24	8	-3.7964	
t5.25	Middle frontal gyrus	L	46	12	-42	24	22	- 3.7338	
t5.26 t5.27	TR 4 (6–8 s after stimulus onset)								
t5.28	Inferior frontal gyrus	L	9	47	-48	4	22	-5.9282	
t5.29	Middle frontal gyrus	R	46	43	50	40	20	-5.8548	
t5.30	Middle frontal gyrus	L	10	24	-42	56	14	-5.2298	
t5.31	Precentral gyrus	R	6	17	62	4	30	-4.9403	
t5.32	Inferior frontal gyrus	R	47	23	36	32	-10	-4.9312	
t5.33	Middle temporal gyrus	R	21	37	66	-2	-20	-4.3198	
t5.34	Cerebellum	L-R		17	-10	-62	-46	-4.2825	
t5.35	Superior frontal gyrus	L	10	16	-38	48	28	-4.1949	
t5.36	Superior temporal gyrus	L	22	42	-50	-18	2	- 3.9873	
t5.37	Superior frontal gyrus	R	8	13	8	28	52	-3.7728	
t5.38	Superior parietal lobule	R	7	40	14	-70	56	-3.7318	
t5.39 t5.40	TR 5 (8–10 s after stimulus onset)								
t5.41	Insula	R-L	13	113	42	-2	18	-5.4646	
t5.42	Postcentral gyrus	L	3	134	-20	-26	50	-4.9002	
t5.43	Precentral gyrus	L-R	6	62	-20	-12	58	-4.3559	
t5.44	Middle frontal gyrus	L	10	17	40	60	12	-4.3218	
t5.45	Fusiform gyrus	L	20	10	- 38	-10	-28	-4.2720	
t5.46	Postcentral gyrus	R	43	84	62	-10	18	-4.2109	
t5.47	Inferior frontal gyrus	R	45	46	46	12	18	-4.1887	
t5.48	Medial frontal gyrus	R	8	16	6	28	48	-3.9781	
t5.49	TP 6 (10, 12 s after stimulus areat)								
t5.50	TR 6 (10–12 s after stimulus onset)	P	45	639	EO	24	1.4	6 0500	
t5.51	Inferior frontal gyrus	R R-L	45 20	10	58 38	24 	14 - 32	-6.9500 -6.3246	
t5.52 t5.53	Fusiform gyrus Middle frontal gyrus	R R	20 10	10 17	38 40	- 14 58	- 32 14	-5.0839	
		K	32	42			48		
t5.54	Medial frontal gyrus	L	1	42	-12 -56	12 -20	48	-4.8589	
t5.55 +5.56	Postcentral gyrus Insula	L L-R	13	116	- 36 - 38	-20 -28	48	-4.7748 -4.7426	
t5.56	Precentral gyrus		4	50	- 38 62	-28 -14	32	-4.7294	
t5.57 +5.58	Superior temporal gyrus	R L	4 41/42	50 87	- 36	-14 -34	32 16	-4.7294 -4.6962	
t5.58 +5.50	Middle frontal gyrus	R	9	66	- 58	-34 18	36	-4.0962 -4.3255	
t5.59 +5.60	Superior frontal gyrus	R	8	17	58	30	36 52	-4.2335 -4.2335	
t5.60	Middle occipital gyrus	R	8 18	46	26	-82	52 10	-4.2335 -4.2309	
t5.61 t5.62	Precentral Gyrus	R	6	46	26	-82 -16	- 10 52	-4.2309 -4.2296	
t5.62 t5.63	Superior Temporal Gyrus	R–L	22	37	58	-10	-2	-4.2296 -4.2217	
t5.64	Precuneus	L K-L	7	36	0		-2 38	- 3.9491	
t5.65	Postcentral gyrus	L	40	65	-30	-40	60	-3.9491 -3.9175	
10.00	- oscentrui 5jrus	L	10		50	UF	00	5,5175	

mental simulations are primarily provided by episodic memory (i.e., the 763 constructive episodic simulation hypothesis; Addis et al., 2007; Schacter 764 et al., 2007; Schacter and Addis, 2007). This view finds stronger support 765 in recent results showing strong interdependence between the 766 hippocampus and the ventral aspect of the MPFC during simulations 767 involving oneself and close others, but not so with individuals that are 768 not perceived as close, similar or familiar (Muscatell et al., 2010; Perry 769 et al., 2011). 770

At this point, it is important to acknowledge a potential challenge with the interpretation of the current results. Given our interest in investigating whether or not the relatively greater involvement of DN 773 during likely relative to unlikely episodic counterfactual simulations 774 may be due to the fact that likely as opposed to unlikely counterfactuals 775 are perceived as more socially and personally relevant by the subject, 776 we purposefully designed the current experiment so that participants 777 would only construct counterfactual simulations they considered likely. 778 To that extent, we succeeded, as participants "could" ratings, which presumably tapped at their subjective assessment of perceived likelihood, 780 were on average above 4 (1 = "No"; 5 = "Yes"), and no participant 781 rated his or her simulations below 3. However, as our behavioral results 782

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t6.1 Table 4a

Regions associated with counterfactual simulations for self versus unfamiliar dissimilar characters (contrast Self > UnfDis; LV 3). Note: All activations reported survived a threshold of
 p <.0002 (BSR = 3.2), with a cluster size > 10. BA = approximate Brodmann area. L = Left; R = Right. *The bootstrap ratio (BSR) is the parameter estimate for that voxel over its standard
 error. It is proportional to a z score.

t6.5					MNI coordin	MNI coordinates		
t6.6	Region of activation	Hemisphere	BA	Voxels	x	Y	Z	BSR*
t6.7	TR 2 (2–4 s after stimulus onset)							
t6.8	Cerebellum	R–L		27	12	12	- 88	5.0691
t6.9	Middle frontal gyrus	L	10	12	- 38	64	4	4.9039
t6.10	Caudate	L		27	-20	-20	28	4.3201
t6.11	Posterior cingulate	R	31	23	26	-66	18	4.3064
t6.12 t6.13	TR 3 (4–6 s after stimulus onset)							
t6.14	Cerebellum	L-R		143	-40	- 78	-40	6.0486
t6.15	Hippocampus	R		11	32	-44	4	3.9246
t6.16	Cingulate gyrus	R	31	10	16	-42	44	3.7024
t6.17 t6.18	TR 4 (6–8 s after stimulus onset)							
t6.19	Cerebellum	L		28	-40	-76	-26	4.6130
t6.20 t6.21	TR 5 (8–10 s after stimulus onset)							
t6.22	Medial frontal gyrus	L-R	10	149	-10	38	-6	5.1137
t6.23	Hippocampus	R		31	34	-46	2	5.0039
t6.24	Cerebellum	L		12	-44	-54	- 50	4.5965
t6.25	Anterior cingulate	R	24/32	46	2	30	10	4.4893
t6.26	Superior frontal gyrus	L	6	10	-10	22	66	4.1087
t6.27	Inferior parietal lobule	R	40	30	54	- 62	40	3.9198
t6.28 t6.29	TR 6 (10–12 s after stimulus onset)							
t6.30	Medial frontal gyrus	L	10	128	- 12	52	-2	4.5654
t6.31	Anterior cingulate	R-L	32	64	6	48	-2	4.1537
t6.32	Inferior parietal lobule	L	40	17	-50	-62	46	4.1055

t Q3 Table 4b

t7.2 Regions associated with counterfactual simulations for unfamiliar dissimilar characters versus self (contrast UnfDis > Self; LV 3).

t7.3					мы coordina	ates		BSR*
t7.4	Region of activation	Hemisphere	BA	Voxels	x	Y	Z	
t7.5	TR 2 (2–4 s after stimulus onset)							
t7.6	Cingulate gyrus	L	24	13	-14	0	34	-4.7253
t7.7	Precentral gyrus	R	4	16	34	-16	40	-4.3838
t7.8	Insula	L	13	29	- 32	10	16	-4.2240
t7.9	Middle occipital gyrus	R	19	12	50	-60	-10	-4.0880
t7.10	Inferior temporal gyrus	R	20	20	64	-14	-24	-4.0879
t7.11	Postcentral gyrus	R	40	22	66	-20	14	-4.0552
t7.12 t7.13	TR 3 (4–6 s after stimulus onset)							
t7.14	Superior temporal gyrus	R	22	47	68	-12	2	-4.8699
t7.15	Fusiform gyrus	L	20	16	-40	- 38	- 18	-4.3375
t7.16	Middle temporal gyrus	L	39	29	- 36	-76	26	-4.1297
t7.17 t7.18	TR 4 (6–8 s after stimulus onset)							
t7.10	Middle temporal gyrus	R	21	39	70	-4	-22	-5.2524
t7.19	Parahippocampal gyrus	R	36	18	38	- 32	-26	-4.9821
t7.20 t7.21	Parahippocampal gyrus	L	28	16	- 18	- 32 - 16	-20 -16	-4.9821 -4.0265
t7.21	Middle frontal gyrus	L	9	10	-26	36	40	-3.9633
t7.22	Whether Hontal gyrus	L	5	14	-20	50	40	- 5,5055
t7.24	TR 5 (8–10 s after stimulus onset)							
t7.25	Parahippocampal gyrus	L	36	198	-42	-22	-24	- 5.8533
t7.26	Inferior frontal gyrus	R-L	45/46	28	52	22	14	-4.5282
t7.27	Inferior frontal gyrus	L	47	38	-34	28	-22	-4.5136
t7.28	Inferior frontal gyrus	R	9	33	48	2	22	-4.3926
t7.29	Middle frontal gyrus	L	6	23	-24	-18	66	-4.2517
t7.30	Middle temporal gyrus	R	21	11	50	-20	-22	-3.8416
t7.31	Superior temporal gyrus	R	22	11	48	-14	-2	-3.7562
t7.32 t7.33	TR 6 (10–12 s after stimulus onset)							
t7.34	Fusiform gyrus	L-R	20	26	-44	-8	-22	-6.1059
t7.35	Inferior frontal gyrus	L	9	60	-56	16	28	- 5.2990
t7.36	Inferior frontal gyrus	R	45	296	54	24	16	-5.0419
t7.37	Inferior occipital gyrus	L	18	35	-40	-92	-8	- 5.0395
t7.38	Middle frontal gyrus	R	11	34	38	42	-14	-4.6795
t7.39	Postcentral gyrus	R	43	56	56	- 18	16	-4.4379
t7.40	Precuneus	L	7	34	-8	- 56	40	-4.4024
t7.40	Insula	R	13	87	44	-10	40	-4.1583
t7.41	Inferior frontal gyrus	L-R	47/46	48	-34	32	0	-4.1374
t7.43	Middle occipital gyrus	L	37	21	- 52	- 68	-12	-3.9145
t7.45	Middle temporal gyrus	R	21	27	52	-14	-20	-3.8270
01.44	initiale temporal gyrus	ix .	21	21	50	17	20	5.0270

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


Fig. 4. Results from seed PLS analysis: Latent Variable 3 (LV 4). (A) Plot of brain scores with confidence intervals. (B) Regions with negative saliences (blue) co-vary with the hippocampal seed during the Self and UnfDis conditions. Regions with positive saliences (red) co-vary with the hippocampal seed during the FamSim condition.

indicate, "could" ratings for self-based simulations were slightly higher 783 784 than for other-based, and these in turn were higher than for objectbased counterfactual simulations. As such, it remains a possibility that 785 the initial finding by De Brigard et al. (2013a, 2013b), showing greater 026 787 involvement of DN for likely relative to unlikely episodic counterfactual thoughts, actually reflects a difference in participants' subjective assess-788 ments of comparative likelihood among counterfactual thoughts 789790 (i.e., possible event A is more/less likely than possible event B) rather than a categorical judgment sharply dividing counterfactuals into likely 791 versus unlikely. Since the current study cannot rule out that interpreta-792 tion, it may be possible that al last some of the variance in the current 793 794 results can be accounted for by a difference in subjective assessments of comparative likelihood for self-, other- and object-based counterfac-795 tual simulations. A future study directly comparing self-, other- and 796 object- based likely versus unlikely counterfactual simulations should 797 798 be able to resolve this potential confound.⁵

Finally, to further understand the role of the hippocampus and its re-799 lation to other regions of the DN during self-relative to other-based 800 counterfactual simulation, a functional connectivity analysis revealed 801 that the right hippocampal seed was functionally coupled with ventro- 802 lateral PFC, lateral temporal gyrus and lingual gyrus during counterfac- 803 tual simulations involving familiar similar characters. The fact that this 804 functional coupling occurred for familiar similar as opposed to self-805 based counterfactual simulations is consistent with recent evidence 806 from Rabin and Rosenbaum (2012) showing involvement in the areas 807 during theory of mind tasks involving familiar characters relative to au-808 tobiographical recollection. Perry et al. (2011) also showed functional 809 coupling between hippocampus and MPFC during autobiographical 810 and theory-of-mind processes involving familiar others. These findings 811 have been interpreted as suggesting that episodic memory details are 812 recruited during simulations involving close similar others to a greater 813 extent than simulations involving those we do not know or with 814 whom we do not share personality traits. Our activation patterns are 815 consistent with this observation. However, differential patterns of 816 functional connectivity convey a different story for the Self and UnfDis 817 conditions. This pattern revealed functional coupling between the 818 hippocampal seed and a number of regions, including superior frontal 819 (BA 10) and middle frontal gyrus (BA 11). The extent to which this 820 functional coupling may be driven by the Self rather than the UnfDis 821 condition is unclear. Different functional connectivity profiles between 822 the hippocampus and prefrontal and lateral temporal areas depend on 823 whether the simulation involves familiar similar or self and unfamiliar 824 dissimilar others. Further research is needed to understand the way in 825 which the hippocampus may contribute to the generation of mental 826 simulations of counterfactual past and possible future events from 827 episodic and semantic details stored in memory (for discussion, see 828 Schacter et al., in press). 829

Taken together, the results of the analyses pertaining to person- 830 based counterfactual simulations dovetail with a recent proposal put 831 forth by Andrews-Hanna and collaborators (Andrews-Hanna et al., 832 2010, 2014 according to which there are different identifiable subsys- 833 tems within the DN. One such subsystem, the medial temporal subsys-834 tem, is preferentially active during internally-generated mental 835 simulations involving self-referential and autobiographical compo-836 nents, such as self-based counterfactual thoughts. But there is another 837 subsystem, the dorsal medial subsystem, which tends to be recruited 838 during internally-generated mental simulations constructed out of 839 narratives involving general and stereotypical social knowledge, 840 among which one could classify mental simulations of counterfactual 841 events involving unfamiliar others. The differential recruitment of 842 these two subsystems during the generation of person-based counter- 843 factual simulations may help explain the effect in counterfactual mu- 844 tation found in our behavioral results, as well as those reported by 845 Girotto et al. (2007) and Pighin et al. (2011), where participants mu- 846 tated different aspects of a decision depending on whether they 847 were actors or readers of the situation. That is, mental simulations 848 generated to evaluate personal counterfactuals may preferentially 849 recruit autobiographical details from episodic memory whereas those 850 generated to evaluate counterfactuals featuring unfamiliar characters 851 may preferentially recruit stereotypical social knowledge from seman- 852 tic memory. 853

Finally, although the focus of the current study was to explore 854 differences in brain activation when entertaining counterfactuals 855 about objects and people we are differently related to, we also found 856 intriguing differences in three modal judgments (i.e., could, would, 857 and should) across all counterfactual conditions. Given previously re-858 ported results showing behavioral (De Brigard et al., 2013b; Szpunar 859 and Schacter, 2013) and brain differences (Weiler et al., 2010; De Q27 Brigard et al., 2013a, 2013b) in perceived likelihood between episodic 861 future and counterfactual thinking, it is worth exploring the extent to 862 which perceived likelihood influences modal judgments on counterfac-863 tual simulations. Similarly, we believe that exploring ways in which 864

⁵ We thank an anonymous reviewer for bringing this issue to our attention.

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t Q4 Table 5a

Peak regions functionally connected with a right hippocampal seed (y = -16) during counterfactual simulation involving a self and unfamiliar dissimilar characters versus familiar similar
 (LV 4).

				MNI coordin			
Region of activation	Hemisphere	BA	Voxels	х	Y	Z	BSR*
Transverse temporal gyrus	L	41	1935	-36	-34	11	-7.5046
Lingual gyrus	R		261	32	-73	7	-6.8901
Claustrum	R		1641	34	6	7	-6.4067
Superior frontal gyrus	L	10	93	-30	59	14	-6.2620
Medial frontal gyrus	R	6	3280	4	-24	64	-6.1991
Inferior temporal gyrus	R–L	19/37	327	55	-70	-2	-5.8427
Cerebellum	L		39	-12	-91	-26	-5.7620
Cuneus	L	30	104	-26	- 75	7	-5.5897
Inferior parietal lobule	L	40	127	-53	- 30	31	-5.217
Precuneus	R–L	7/19	133	16	-48	50	- 5.1355
Thalamus	L		22	-18	-28	16	-5.0887
Postcentral gyrus	R–L	2/3	352	44	-24	27	-4.9190
Middle temporal gyrus	R	21	19	67	-16	-4	-4.3742
Anterior cingulate	R	33	51	6	9	20	-4.3301
Middle frontal gyrus	L	11	48	-30	42	-12	-4.1377

865 other factors, such as desirability or vividness, affect our modal judg-866 ments on different person-based counterfactual simulations is a fruitful and important avenue for future research. After all, the results reported 867 here strongly suggest that the kinds of hypothetical simulations upon 868 which modal judgments are based are complex, and that they draw 869 on different brain systems depending on the contents of the simulation. 870 Considering how often people's actions are judged on the basis of 871 whether we think they could or should have done otherwise, and how 872 frequently such judgments carry profound legal and moral implications, 873 understanding the precise cognitive mechanisms underlying modal 874 judgments during counterfactual simulations remains an issue of 875 upmost importance for future research. 876

Q28 Uncited reference

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885 Appendix A. Supplementary data

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t8.1 Table 5b

Peak regions functionally connected with a right hippocampal seed (y = -16) during counterfactual simulations involving familiar similar characters versus self and unfamiliar dissimilar dissimilar characters (LV 4). Note: All activations reported survived a threshold of p < .0002 (BSR = 3.2), with a cluster size > 10. BA = approximate Brodmann area. L = Left; R = Right. *The boot-strap ratio (BSR) is the parameter estimate for that voxel over its standard error. It is proportional to a z score.).

t8.5					MNI coordina	ites		
t8.6	Region of activation	Hemisphere	BA	Voxels	x	Y	Z	BSR*
t8.7	Superior frontal gyrus	R-L	8	51	44	18	51	4.3811
t8.8	Inferior parietal lobule	L	40	19	- 59	-44	45	4.1423
t8.9	Inferior frontal gyrus	R	46	28	44	30	10	3.9195
t8.10	Middle temporal gyrus	R	22	10	-67	-46	6	3.7095
t8.11	Cerebellum	L		11	-24	-28	-19	3.6580
t8.12	Lingual gyrus	R–L	18/19	10	18	-72	0	3.5915

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