

**KANT, IMMANUEL (1724-1804).** Immanuel Kant was born and spent his life in Königsberg, Prussia, now Kaliningrad, Russia. Although his family was poor, Kant was educated in a good Pietist school and attended the University of Königsberg from 1740-1747. From 1747-1755 he worked as a private tutor for various families in the Königsberg area. From 1755 -1770 he was a *Privatdozent* at the University, lecturing on subjects as diverse as logic, mathematics, metaphysics, ethics, anthropology, and geography. In 1770 he became Professor of Logic and Metaphysics. He taught until 1796, and died in 1804.

Restricted to a quiet life by a modest income, delicate health, and a demanding workload, Kant never married or traveled. Popular tradition portrays Kant as rigid and moralistic, as devoted to system and rule in his life as he was in his work. This picture must be tempered by the less familiar set of images handed down to us by his friends and students: of a genial host famous for his powers of conversation; of an immensely popular teacher whose students claimed that they “never left a single lecture in his ethics without having become better men”; and of “the Old Jacobin” whose passionate defense of the French Revolution astonished and inspired his contemporaries.

**EARLY VIEWS AND THE CRITICAL PROJECT.** Kant was educated in the predominant “Leibniz-Wolffian philosophy,” an extreme form of dogmatic rationalism, but its influence on him was mitigated by his interest in British philosophy and science. A disposition to question the power of pure reason shows up even in his “pre-critical” works, those written before he made the discoveries that led to the three *Critiques*. It is evident in the ethical views he expresses in the “Enquiry Concerning the Clarity of the Principles of Natural Theology and Ethics” (1763). There Kant argues that reason is the source of the Wolffian ethical principle that one ought to do the action which realizes the most perfection, but also that this principle is an empty formalism, whose content may have to be supplied by feeling. The moral sense, as described by Hutcheson, is proposed as a possible source for that content.

This eclectic position resulted from Kant's interest in the contemporary philosophical debate between the ethical rationalists and sentimentalists. The sentimentalists posed serious challenges to their rationalist opponents, and Kant greatly admired the work of Francis Hutcheson and Adam Smith. But they were unable to produce a satisfactory account of obligation, which Kant regarded as the primary moral concept. The dogmatic rationalists did treat obligation as central, but believed that the concept is self-evident and unanalyzable, a view that would later become unacceptable to Kant. Kant found the key to explaining obligation in the works of Rousseau, another major influence on his ethical views. Rousseau's remark, in *The Social Contract*, that "to be governed by appetite alone is slavery, while obedience to a law one prescribes to oneself is freedom" may be the source of Kant's leading idea: that obligation is grounded in autonomy. In the 1760's Kant wrote that it was Rousseau who taught him the value of humanity.

Sometime during the 1760's and 70's Kant undertook his critical project: the attempt to ascertain the scope and limits of pure reason. Kant formulates his project in terms of the question: "How are synthetic a priori judgments possible?" A judgment is *synthetic* if it has substantive content - more formally, if the concept of the predicate is not already contained in the concept of the subject; otherwise, it is *analytic*. A judgment is *a priori* if it can be known independently of experience; *a posteriori* if it can only be known through experience. The substantive dictates of pure reason, if there are any, must be expressed in synthetic a priori judgments. The question of reason's power is the question how such judgments can be established; this is the question of Kant's *Critiques*.

*The Critique of Pure Reason* (1781; 2nd. ed., 1787) attempts to answer this question about the principles of the understanding (e.g., Every event has a cause) and the claims of speculative metaphysics (God exists, the will is free, the soul is immortal). Kant believed that we can establish the principles of the understanding, but only for *phenomena*, or things as they appear to us. The principles of the understanding are established as conditions of the possibility of our experience. The claims of speculative metaphysics, which are based on the

extension of these principles to *noumena*, or things as they are in themselves, are therefore unfounded: we cannot know whether they are true or false. These conclusions make room for Kant's more positive account of the powers of pure *practical* reason.

Practical principles are a priori because "ought" expresses rational necessity. Already in the early essay mentioned above, Kant had observed that it is not difficult to establish *conditional* rational necessity, that is, the necessity of taking the means to an end. As he later argues, conditional necessity is expressed by *hypothetical imperatives*, which have the form: If you would achieve end-E, you ought to do action-A. Hypothetical imperatives derive their necessity from the principle that whoever wills an end, insofar as reason governs his conduct, also wills the necessary means to that end. This principle is *analytic* for the will, since willing something is deciding to cause it, and deciding to cause it is deciding to use the means to bring it about. Moral principles, however, express the *unconditional* necessity of doing certain actions or adopting certain purposes. They are *categorical imperatives*, which have the form: You ought to do action-A; or adopt purpose-P. Here the imperative clause is not arrived at by analyzing a previously given act of the will. Kant believed that the fundamental moral principle is therefore synthetic a priori, and must be established by critique.

**GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS (1785).** In the *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*, Kant's purpose is to seek out and establish the supreme principle of morality. The first two sections of this work are written in an what he calls an "analytic" style: one that starts from what we suppose we know and uncovers what that knowledge presupposes. In Section One, Kant begins from the idea that only a good will and actions expressive of such a will have unconditional value. Since a person of good will acts from the motive of duty, analysis of actions done from this motive will show us what the principle of a good will is. Acting from duty is not a matter of having certain purposes, Kant argues, for a good purpose, such as helping others, may be adopted either from duty or from natural inclination. The distinguishing feature of an action done from

duty is that the agent sees doing the action or promoting its purpose as something that is required of him; something that it is *necessary* for him to do. This feature is captured in the *maxim*, or subjective principle, on which the agent acts: Kant says that a person who acts with a good will sees his maxim as having the form of a law. The principle of a good will, therefore, is the principle of adopting only those maxims which you can will to be laws.

In Section Two the same conclusion is reached by another route - a general analysis of the role of reason in action. The concept of obligation, or unconditionally necessary action, can be analyzed to yield the same principle uncovered in Section One. Since an obligatory action is required or necessary, the maxim of performing it must be conceived as a law. Since the necessity is unconditional, the will is not bound to some *particular* law, as by a sanction. It must therefore be the idea of law in general which obligates us. The principle of obligation is therefore the principle of acting on those maxims which we conceive to be laws. This yields the first formulation of Kant's categorical imperative, the Formula of Universal Law: "Act only on a maxim which you can at the same time will to be a universal law."

Hegel's contention that this formula is empty initiated a long-standing controversy about whether it yields substantial and morally correct results. Kant believed that in order to determine whether you can will your maxim to be a universal law, you should ask whether you could consistently will it to be a law of nature. However, neither what Kant means by "a law of nature" nor what sort of contradiction he has in mind is entirely clear, and seems to be different in the different examples he gives. In some examples, he seems to mean "a practical principle that is and always has been followed by everyone," and his question is whether you could will your maxim to be such a principle while at the same time willing to act on it yourself. In some cases, this would be logically contradictory; in others, at least self-defeating. For example, Kant argues that if everyone acted on the principle of making a lying promise whenever it was convenient, promises would not be possible, or at least would not be accepted, and therefore would not be an effective way of achieving your ends. You

cannot will the maxim of false promising and its universalization at the same time, since willing the universalization of the maxim undercuts the rationality of willing the maxim itself. In other examples, however, Kant appears to be asking whether the maxim could be a law in a teleological system of nature. Much of the English literature on Kant's ethics has been devoted to the question whether the Formula of Universal Law can be made to work as a criterion for determining the morality of actions.

Mere analysis of the concept of moral obligation shows that the Formula of Universal Law is its principle. But it is another question how this principle is "possible" - that is, how it can be binding on the will. In preparation for answering this question in Section Three, Kant must explain what kind of motivation is involved in acting from the categorical imperative. He argues that since every willed action is done with an end in view, the possibility of morality depends on the existence of an objectively necessary end. He proposes that the one end we must all treat as an end in itself is our *humanity*, by which he means the rational power of self-determination, and especially the power to determine our own ends. The value we place on ourselves is implicit in the value we place on the ends which we decide to pursue. This leads Kant to a new formulation of the categorical imperative: "Act always so that you treat humanity, in your own person or another, never merely as a means but also at the same time as an end in itself." The Formula of Humanity tells us to respect the power of self-determination in others and to cherish and cultivate that power in ourselves. It makes it a duty to share in the ends of others and to treat them only in ways to which they can consent. The most characteristically Kantian moral prescriptions - the strict respect for freedom of choice and action, and the resulting prohibitions against coercion, deception, and paternalism, are most naturally associated with this formula. Kant's claim that this formula is equivalent to the Formula of Universal Law - that treating humanity as an end and acting only on universalizable maxims are the same thing - has generated much controversy.

Kant combines the ideas of legislation (associated with the Formula of Universal Law) and self-determination (associated with the Formula of Humanity) in a third set of formulas, in terms of autonomous legislation in the Kingdom of Ends. There are two ways in which we may be motivated to obey a law: heteronomously or autonomously. The person who acts heteronomously is motivated to obey the law by some interest; say, in avoiding a punishment or getting a reward. For this reason, the imperative from which her maxim is drawn must be hypothetical - "if you would get the reward, you ought to do this action." Since the moral imperative is categorical rather than hypothetical, the person who acts from it must be motivated autonomously: that is, directly by the fact that she acknowledges it to have the force of law. The laws of morality, then, must be laws we impose on ourselves. Conversely, Kant believed that all autonomous action must be governed by the moral law. The moral law simply tells us never to act on a principle we could not will as a law, and therefore the only restriction it imposes on us is that of acting in accordance with our autonomy. For this reason, Kant supposed that the categorical imperative is *the* law of autonomy.

This connection between morality and autonomy led Kant to construct of his ideal of the perfect moral community - the Kingdom of Ends. Citizens of the Kingdom of Ends legislate the moral law together. They act only in ways to which all can consent, and share in the pursuit of one another's ends. They are autonomous both because they make their own laws and because those laws direct them to respect one another's autonomy. When we act morally, Kant claims, we act from a conception of ourselves as citizens of the Kingdom of Ends.

Sections One and Two establish what the principle of a good will is and what sort of motivation is involved in acting on it. They tell us what morality is *if* it exists. But to show that morality really does exist - that the categorical imperative is binding on us - Kant must go beyond the "analytic" method of the first two sections and produce a "synthetic" argument to show how we can be motivated in the way described. This is the work of

Section Three. As self-conscious rational beings, Kant argues, we must regard ourselves as possessing free wills. We cannot think of our actions as causally determined by outside forces or natural laws. So far this conception of our freedom is merely negative. Since the will is a form of causality, however, its actions must be determined in accordance with some law or principle. The free will, therefore, must be conceived as autonomous, the author of its own laws. Since we must regard ourselves as free, we must regard ourselves as autonomous and so bound by the moral law. The moral law is in fact the positive conception of freedom.

But both the text of Section Three of the *Groundwork* and the *Critique of Practical Reason* show that Kant was not satisfied with this argument; he worried that it might be circular. We cannot be motivated by the moral law unless we are free. But because the moral law is itself the positive conception of freedom, we are not free unless we can be motivated by the moral law. Freedom and morality are “reciprocal concepts” and so in thinking of ourselves as free we may be presupposing that we are bound by morality. In the *Groundwork*, Kant tries to alleviate this worry by seeking an independent ground for regarding ourselves as free. The distinction between things as they appear to us and as they are in themselves gives us “two standpoints” from which we may regard ourselves and our actions. We may think of ourselves as parts of the phenomenal world or series of appearances. But we may also think of ourselves as members of the noumenal or ‘intelligible’ world, that is, as among the active beings we conceive as generating the appearances. Drawing on the conclusions of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant reminds us that it is only in the phenomenal world that causal determinism holds. If we have grounds for regarding ourselves as members of the noumenal world, we may regard ourselves as free. Kant thinks such grounds may be found in our consciousness of the spontaneity of reason in its production of pure ideas. Insofar as we are spontaneously active we must belong to the noumenal world. The idea of the two standpoints also solves the problem of reconciling free will and determinism. Our actions must be regarded as causally determined only insofar

as we view them as appearances. Insofar as we take their ground to be the agency of the will in the noumenal world, we may also regard them as free.

***CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON (1788)***. Kant had planned to proceed from the *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals* to the *Metaphysics of Morals* itself, but he apparently continued to be dissatisfied with the argument described above. No extant discussion tells us exactly why, and the relation between Section Three of the *Groundwork* and the *Critique of Practical Reason* remains a subject of scholarly debate. In any case, in the second *Critique* Kant produces a new argument for the moral law, which he calls a “credential” for it.

When we make a decision about what to do, or, in Kant’s language, adopt a maxim, reflection on whether our reasons justify our actions leads us to an awareness of the moral law. And we find that it is a fact - as Kant calls it, the Fact of Reason - that we can be motivated to act as this law requires, even when our strongest natural inclination is opposed to it. From this, in turn, we learn that we are free, and therefore that we have reason to regard ourselves as members of the noumenal world. Freedom is deduced from morality, although only from a practical point of view. We do not have theoretical knowledge that we are free, but rather a belief in our freedom that is justified by pure practical reason. Practical reason therefore both supplies the positive conception of freedom, and gives us grounds for attributing that freedom to ourselves.

This argument shows that the power of practical reason is greater than that of theoretical reason, which can think of freedom only in a negative way - as the absence of empirical causality - and cannot attribute it to any object. Kant devotes much of the *Critique of Practical Reason* to detailing the respective tasks of theoretical and practical reason, and explaining the relationship between them. He explains how practical reason constructs its own object, the good; how it teaches us how to realize that object in the world; and how it provides us with an incentive to do so.

In the second part of the book, the Dialectic, Kant shows how practical reason also gives rise to positive conceptions of God and immortality. Morality, according to Kant, requires not only that we obey the categorical imperative, but that in so doing we see ourselves as bringing forth the *highest good*, a world in which virtue is necessarily accompanied by happiness. It is not within our power to bring this about by our own efforts, yet we must view our actions as contributing to its realization. This gives rise to a “need of reason” to believe in the conditions under which the highest good would be the result of our actions. These conditions are the existence of a personal God, who sees into our hearts and arranges the laws of nature so that happiness will be the reward of virtue; and an immortal life, in which we can achieve the moral perfection which is impossible in this life. Because we must believe that the highest good is possible, and because (as Kant argued in the first *Critique*) theoretical reason has nothing to say against the existence of God and immortality, it is rational - practically rather than theoretically - to believe in them. Kant calls the assertions of our own freedom and immortality and of God’s existence “Postulates of Pure Practical Reason.”

This argument, versions of which appear in both of the other two *Critiques*, gives content to Kant’s claim, in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, that he has “found it necessary to deny knowledge, in order to make room for faith.” (19) The ideas we arrive at of God and immortality through speculative metaphysics alone are those of a cause of the world, and the persistence of a simple substance. These ideas are inadequate for the practical interests expressed in religion. Theoretical reason can neither affirm that anything corresponding to these ideas is real nor define them in any more positive way. But practical reason gives us grounds for both. Practical reason generates its own set of concepts, and is the source of religious as well as moral ideas.

**RELIGION WITHIN THE LIMITS OF REASON ALONE (1793).** In *Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone*, Kant works out some of the theological implications of this

view. Here he takes up such issues as salvation and grace, miracles, and the proper roles of ritual, the church, and the clergy. Kant believed that Christianity most clearly reveals the true moral core of all religion. To illustrate this he gives interpretations of Christian scripture and doctrine designed to show that their real meaning is moral. Despite this favorable attitude toward Christianity, Kant's views got him into trouble. He inveighs against any doctrine according to which anything other than a morally good disposition is required for salvation, and so challenges the authority of the established church. King Frederick Wilhelm II forbade Kant to write any more about religious subjects, and Kant obeyed until Frederick's death in 1797.

**MORAL PSYCHOLOGY** *Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone* is an essential text for understanding Kant's views on moral psychology. Prior to this his only sustained treatment of moral psychology is the chapter "The Incentives of Pure Practical Reason" in the second *Critique*. There Kant takes up the question how the moral law operates as an incentive, that is, how it operates on the faculty of desire (the practical faculty in general) to incite us to action. Like other rationalists who admired Hutcheson, Kant saw the importance of explaining the affective component of moral experience. Kant's own doctrine of the duality of human mental faculties, as both active and passive, implies that any mental activity has a passive correlate: our conscious awareness of that activity in inner sense. This awareness may also involve feelings in the ordinary sense of pleasure and pain. In the chapter on the moral incentive, Kant argues that our consciousness of the moral law does necessarily involve a feeling - the feeling of respect (*Achtung*). This feeling has components of both pleasure and pain. The awareness of duty has a painful element, for it may frustrate our desires, and it humiliates our "self-conceit," or tendency to view our own happiness as unconditionally good. At the same time, the suppression of natural inclination gives us a sense of independence, or freedom, which is pleasant, and facilitates moral action. Human beings are therefore subject to two distinct kinds of incentives to action - the moral incentive

of respect, and the natural incentives of inclination and fear. The difference between these is *not* whether feeling is involved, but whether the feeling is produced by the activity of our own reason or by the work of empirical causes upon us. Moral interest is produced by our identification with those incentives that spring from our own rational activity, and express our true nature. In his writings on moral education, in the “Methodologies” of the *Critique of Practical Reason* and of the *Metaphysical Principles of Virtue*, Kant focuses on awakening and strengthening the moral incentive. Virtue is instilled by giving the student an interest in his free and autonomous nature.

In *Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone*, Kant takes up the question whether and in what sense human beings are naturally good or evil, and resolves both apparent and real problems to which the earlier works give rise. Kant’s claim that morality and freedom are reciprocal concepts - that freedom is only realized in morally good action - seems to imply that actions that are at once free and evil are impossible. Kant’s moral psychology was not fully worked out in the *Groundwork*, and he sometimes seems to suggest there that the source of evil is our sensible nature. These views together give rise to problems about how we can be held responsible for moral evil, and how, if our choices are free, evil actions can even occur.

Some of these worries may be alleviated by a proper understanding of Kant’s doctrine of the two standpoints. That evil actions are impossible to explain Kant readily grants, but he reminds us in the *Religion* that all actions, when viewed as free, are impossible to explain. When we view an action as a candidate for explanation we are viewing it as a phenomenon and so as caused. When we view an action as a candidate for moral assessment, we are viewing it as free and so as the object of a noumenal choice. Since the moral law is the law of freedom, evil action would be unintelligible for a purely noumenal or active being, but it is not so for human beings, who are subject to temptation by the incentives of natural inclination. This does not mean, however, that our sensible nature is the *cause* of evil. In the *Religion*, Kant asserts that all human beings have a “predisposition to

good,” meaning both that the moral law is an incentive for us and that, when properly regulated by moral requirements, the incentives provided by our natural inclinations lead us to the good. But there is “radical evil” in human nature, for we also have a “propensity to evil.” This propensity is expressed in frailty - our failure to act on good maxims we have adopted; impurity - our dependence on natural incentives to support moral ones; and finally wickedness - our tendency to reverse the order of priority among our incentives. To be wicked, in other words, is to make consistency with happiness the condition of doing your duty rather than making consistency with duty the condition of pursuing happiness. Kant denies that it is open to us to ignore either moral or natural incentives. He also denies (contrary to St. Augustine) that the human will can be “malignant,” or take evil itself as an incentive. Our freedom consists in determining the order of priority between moral and natural incentives; and when we do this wrongly, we may be held responsible for it.

***THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS (1797).*** Kant’s substantive views on morality are presented in *The Metaphysics of Morals*, published in two parts, *The Metaphysical Principles of Justice* and *The Metaphysical Principles of Virtue*. In the general introduction to the book and the introduction to the second part, Kant explains the grounds of this division. The principle of justice commands only the external performance or non-performance of specific actions. Duties of justice are legislated externally in the sense that it is both possible and morally permissible to enforce them by means of sanctions. They are correlative with the rights of others, and their purpose is to secure the external freedom of all. They are of strict obligation, meaning that specific actions are commanded or forbidden.

The principle of virtue, by contrast, commands internal attitudes and especially the adoption of moral ends. Duties of virtue are legislated internally in the sense that we require them of ourselves. They are of broad obligation, meaning that it is not strictly speaking the actions but the adoption of their maxims which is required. Their purpose is to secure internal freedom, or freedom of the will. Because all moral duties secure either political

liberty or freedom of the will, Kant calls the laws of morality collectively the “laws of freedom.”

**VIRTUE.** Determining the dictate of practical reason is one thing; determining how imperfectly rational creatures may be made responsive to that dictate is another. This is the subject of the *Metaphysical Principles of Virtue*, which is concerned with how we achieve inner freedom by cultivating our moral dispositions. Because human beings must always act with some end in view, virtue is cultivated by the adoption of morally good ends. This is commanded by the Supreme Principle of the Doctrine of Virtue, which tells us to act according to a maxim whose ends are such that there can be a universal law that everyone has these ends. Kant sometimes claims that the ends in question are one’s own perfection and the happiness of others. But in fact a number of morally required ends appear in Kant’s works, all of which can be seen as expressing the value of humanity as an end in itself. The rights of humanity are an end for the person who has the virtue of justice; the institution of republican constitutions is a necessary end for sovereigns; and we are required to regard both peace and the achievement of the highest good as ends of our morally good actions generally. Training ourselves to act with these ends in view guides us to the adoption of morally required maxims and strengthens our will against temptations springing from natural inclinations. Although feelings cannot be directly required of us, certain feelings are naturally associated with the adoption of these ends, and these make us more sensitive to the occasions of virtue and readier to follow its dictate. One who properly values the humanity in others will feel gratitude for their benevolence and sympathy with their happiness, and will not take malicious delight in their misdeeds or misfortunes. Indeed, Kant says that “sympathetic feeling in general is a duty.”(456) Kant explains the role of feeling this way: “When therefore it is said, ‘Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself,’ this does not mean you should directly (at first) love and through this love (subsequently) benefit him, but rather, ‘Do good to your neighbor,’ and this beneficence will produce in you the love of mankind

(as a readiness of inclination towards beneficence in general).” (402) Although feelings are not directly required they are a sign that one has achieved the inner disposition that is required. Like Aristotle, Kant asserts that “what is not done with pleasure but as mere compulsory service has no inner worth.” (484)

In the body of the work Kant spells out the duties of virtue in some detail, in the terms of the Formula of Humanity. The requirement of valuing humanity in our own person as an end gives us two kinds of duties. We have perfect duties to avoid damaging, interfering with, or misusing our rational capacities, and imperfect duties to cultivate those capacities. Among the former are the duties not to commit suicide, to avoid the abuse of alcohol and drugs, to use our sexual capacities properly, and to eschew lies, self-deception, avarice, and servility. Among the latter are the duties of developing our natural and moral powers. Kant understands the duties to be kind to animals and to cherish beautiful things as indirect duties to ourselves, arising from the bad effects which cruelty and wanton destructiveness have on our characters.

Our duties to others are divided into those of love and respect. Love for the humanity in others should make us benevolent, sympathetic, and grateful; respect curbs pride, calumny, and mockery. The duties associated with friendship involve achieving the perfect balance of these two attitudes. An ideal friendship, the most perfect kind of human relationship, is an intimate union of two people through equal mutual love and respect.

**JUSTICE.** Kant’s views on political philosophy are found in the *Metaphysical Principles of Justice* and the various papers he wrote on history. Political morality is governed by the Universal Principle of Justice, which tells us to act in a way that is compatible with the freedom of everyone according to a universal law. The use of coercion to prevent actions which are not compatible with universal freedom is morally permissible, because it is permissible to hinder a hindrance to freedom. All actions consistent with freedom are permissible, and from this Kant, following the social contract tradition, derives a right to

claim property in the state of nature. Property rights are an extension of the innate right to freedom with which every human being is born. The enforcement of an individual's property rights in the state of nature is morally legitimate, but because it must be consistent with universal freedom, it cannot be unilateral. It must therefore take the form of establishing a condition of public justice, in which everyone is bound to respect everyone else's rights. In other words, the only legitimate way to prosecute your rights in the state of nature is to compel your opponent to enter with you into a political state. Kant does not see the state of nature as historical. Instead, he sees these arguments as establishing that political life is the object of a general will, which makes the political state legitimate.

Although the purpose of the state is to secure rights grounded in universal freedom, some of Kant's views are surprisingly conservative. The ideal state is a republic in which the citizens protect their rights through their representatives, but no existing state approaches this ideal. Kant therefore argues that any extant government should be taken to be legitimate, and its sovereign to be the voice of the general will. Despite his own enthusiasm for the French Revolution, Kant argues that there is no right to revolution. A revolution by definition is opposed to the general will; reform must be carried out by the sovereign alone. However, if a revolution does succeed, its party is then the extant and so the legitimate government, and must be treated as such.

Although citizens are in essence free, equal, and independent, Kant endorses a category of "passive citizens," including apprentices, servants, minors, and "all women", all of whom are not fit to vote because they lack financial independence. The category is only legitimate, Kant concedes, if its members are enabled to work up to the status of active citizens, but he does not say what it means for women to do this. In a similar inconsistency, Kant declares absolute equality to be necessary in marriage, but not to be violated by laws which make the husband head of household and command the wife to obey him. In a more liberal spirit, Kant argues that because everyone is equally dependent on the existence of the

state, the state may levy welfare taxes for the poor. This is a matter of right and not charity, and should not be handled by voluntary contributions.

The state's right to punish is justified by the legitimacy of using coercion to hinder hindrances to freedom, and its purpose is deterrent. But Kant thinks that to determine the *degree* of punishment we should use a retributive standard. This is the only standard consistent with the dignity of humanity, since to set the degree of punishment by utilitarian considerations is to treat the criminal as a mere means.

Kant then turns to matters of international justice, and, like other social contractarians, notices that the real condition of nations with regard to one another mimics the hypothetical condition of individuals in the state of nature. The solution suggested is the same - the establishment of public justice through a world government. Kant considers this to be impracticable, however, and proposes instead a voluntary congress or league of nations, which he describes as a "negative surrogate" of a world republic. Accordingly, the laws governing the conduct of nations in the state of nature are a negative surrogate of the laws governing the individual conduct. Individuals may only prosecute their rights by entering into a political state; nations may only prosecute their rights in a way that *does not preclude* entry into a world federation. From this principle Kant derives his laws of war, set forth in the *Metaphysical Principles of Justice* and in *Perpetual Peace*. War must be conducted in a way that preserves equality and mutual respect among nations. No wars of extermination, punishment, or conquest may be fought; no stratagems which will preclude a return to trust, such as the use of spies or guerillas, may be employed. Every war must be fought on terms that make the return to just relations possible.

**PEACE, HISTORY, AND THE FRENCH REVOLUTION.** According to Kant, the achievement of peace and the realization of justice and morality are inseparable. If all nations were republics and the citizens had the right to vote on whether to go to war, war would come to an end. Conversely, only when war comes to an end will the end of

oppression and the beginning of enlightenment - which leads to morality - be possible. In *The Metaphysical Principles of Justice*, Kant argues that just as we must view our moral actions as contributions to the achievement of the highest good, we must view them as tending towards the achievement of peace. A faith in the moral progress of history, exactly modeled on religious faith, is a need of practical reason.

This faith may be supported by consideration of the teleological process discernible in history and nature, detailed in Kant's essays on history. The natural world seems designed to force human beings to enter into conditions of justice. War initially drives us apart, forcing us to inhabit different parts of the globe. The fact that nature has provided something to live on in every region, and our own adaptability, guarantee the eventual population of the whole earth. Economic trade, encouraged by the different products available in different areas, induces us to enter into relations with one another once more, and will ultimately provide a motive for the nations to accept peaceful juridical conditions. With peace and justice come enlightenment. The nations will be able to guarantee civil liberties, and spend money on education rather than arms. Enlightenment, the condition in which people think for themselves, leads to morality, the condition in which people live by the laws of their own autonomy. This interpretation of the progress of history does not admit of a theoretical proof, but the moral agent may take it as a ground for hope that nature will cooperate with his efforts to promote justice and peace.

Kant saw another ground for hope in the French Revolution, his admiration for which earned him the nickname "The Old Jacobin." In the essay "On An Old Question Raised Again: Is the Human Race Constantly Progressing?" Kant asks: does history provide evidence as to whether the human race is likely to improve, degenerate, or stagnate morally? He finds such evidence in a specific event: the enthusiastic response of the spectators of the French Revolution. The French Revolution aims at a republican constitution and so at the form of government under which justice and peace will be achieved. The passionate enthusiasm of the spectators, expressed even in the face of danger to themselves, can have

no other source than the awakening moral disposition of the human race. In this essay, one of the last he was to publish, Kant wrote: “I claim to be able to predict to the human race - even without prophetic insight ... its progress towards the better.” (88) Kant believed that the French Revolution and the moral passion inspired by it would never be forgotten, and that the eventual triumphs of freedom and morality are assured.

### Works by Kant

The standard edition of Kant’s works, the Prussian Academy Edition, is *Kants gesammelte Schriften*, 28 volumes. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Company, 1902-. The page numbers found in the margins of most translations refer to this edition. A complete translation of Kant’s works into English is currently under preparation at Cambridge University Press, under the general editorship of Paul Guyer and Allen Wood. Kant’s major ethical works, *The Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*, *The Critique of Practical Reason*, and *The Metaphysics of Morals*, translated by Mary Gregor, may be found together in the volume of that series entitled *Practical Philosophy* (New York: Cambridge University Press 1996).

The following is a list of Kant’s most important ethical writings (in order of original publication) with information about English translations currently available and in use. The translations of Kant’s essays on history appear in several collections. Publication information for short works is given in the five collections listed last.

\_\_\_\_\_. *Untersuchung über die Deutlichkeit der Grundsätze der Natürlichen Theologie und Moral*. 1764.

Translated by David Walford as *Inquiry Concerning the Distinctness of the Principles of Natural Theology and Morality* (in *Immanuel Kant: Theoretical Philosophy 1755-1770*, Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant, 1992); by Lewis White Beck as *An Inquiry Into the Distinctness of the Principles of Natural Theology and Morals* (in his

- Immanuel Kant: Critique of Practical Reason and Other Writings in Moral Philosophy*, U. of Chicago, 1949; reprinted, Garland, 1976); and by G. B. Kerferd and D. E. Walford as *Enquiry concerning the clarity of the principles of natural theology and ethics* (in their *Kant: Selected Pre-Critical Writings and Correspondence with Beck*, Barnes & Noble, 1968).
- \_\_\_\_\_. *Lectures on Ethics*. 1775---. There are two books under this title. Peter Heath's translations of notes by Herder, Collins, Mrongovius, and Vigilantius are available in his *Immanuel Kant: Lectures on Ethics* (Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant, 1997). Paul Menzer's 1924 Compilation of the lecture notes of Brauer, Kutzner, and Mrongovious, *Eine Vorlesung Kant's über Ethik im Auftrage der Kantgesellschaft*, is translated by Louis Infeld as *Lectures on Ethics*. (Methuen, 1930; reprinted Hackett, 1980).
- \_\_\_\_\_. *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*. 1st ed. 1781, 2nd ed. 1787. Translated by Norman Kemp Smith as *Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*. (Macmillan, St. Martin's, 1965) and by Paul Guyer and Allen Wood as *Critique of Pure Reason* (Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant, 1998).
- \_\_\_\_\_. *Idee zu der einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbürgerlicher Absicht*. 1784. Translated by Beck as "Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Point of View"; by Nisbet as "Idea for a Universal History for a Cosmopolitan Purpose" by Humphrey as "Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Intent," and by Wood as "Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Aim."
- \_\_\_\_\_. *Beantwortung der Frage: Was ist Aufklärung?* 1784. Translated by Beck as "What is Enlightenment?" and by Reiss and Humphrey, and also by Gregor, as "An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?"
- \_\_\_\_\_. *Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten*. 1785. Translated by Mary Gregor as *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals* (in her *Immanuel Kant: Practical Philosophy*, Cambridge 1996, and in the series Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy, 1998); by Lewis White Beck as *Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals* (Library of Liberal Arts, 1959); by

- H.J. Paton as *Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals* (Harper, 1964); and by James Ellington as *Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals* (Hackett, 1983). An older translation by Thomas Abbott, *Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals* (Library of Liberal Arts, 1949) is no longer much in use.
- \_\_\_\_\_. *Mutmasslicher Anfang der Menschen Geschichte*. 1786. Translated by Fackenheim and also by Wood as “Conjectural Beginning of Human History” and by Humphrey as “Speculative Beginning of Human History.”
- \_\_\_\_\_. *Kritik der praktischen Vernunft*. 1788. Translated as *Critique of Practical Reason* by Mary Gregor (in her *Immanuel Kant: Practical Philosophy*, Cambridge 1996, and in the series Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy, 1997); and by Lewis White Beck (Library of Liberal Arts, 1956).
- \_\_\_\_\_. *Kritik der Urteilskraft*. 1790. Translated as *Critique of the Power of Judgment* by Paul Guyer and Eric Matthews (Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant, 2000); and as *Critique of Judgement* by J. H. Bernard (Hafner, 1951); James Meredith (Oxford U. Press, 1928, 1952); and Werner Pluhar (Hackett, 1987).
- \_\_\_\_\_. *Über den Gemeinspruch: Das mag in der Theorie richtig sein, taugt aber nicht für die Praxis*. 1793. Translated by Gregor as “On the Common Saying: That may be correct in theory, but it is of no use in practice,” by Nisbet as “On the Common Saying: ‘This may be True in Theory but it does not Apply in Practice’”; and by Humphrey as “On the Proverb: That May be True in Theory, But is of no Practical Use.”
- \_\_\_\_\_. *Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft*. 1793. *Religion within the boundaries of mere reason* by George di Giovanni (Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant, 1996); and by Theodore M. Greene and Hoyt H. Hudson as *Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone*. (Reprinted Harper, 1960).
- \_\_\_\_\_. *Das Ende aller Dinge*. 1794. Translated by Wood and also by Anchor and Humphrey as “The End of All Things.”

- \_\_\_\_\_. *Zum ewigen Frieden: Ein philosophischer Entwurf*. 1795. Translated by Gregor as “Toward perpetual peace,” by Beck as “Perpetual Peace” and by Nisbet and Humphrey as “Perpetual Peace, A Philosophical Sketch.”
- \_\_\_\_\_. *Metaphysik der Sitten*. 1797. Translated by Mary Gregor as *The Metaphysics of Morals* (in her *Immanuel Kant: Practical Philosophy*, Cambridge 1996, and in the series Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy, 1996). Part I, *Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Rechtslehre*, is also translated by John Ladd as *The Metaphysical Elements of Justice* *The Metaphysics of Morals*, Part I (Hackett, 1999). The dated translation of Part I by W.H. Hastie, *Philosophy of Law* (1887), has occasionally been reprinted. The General Introduction and Part II, *Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Tugendlehre*, is also translated by James Ellington as *The Metaphysical Principles of Virtue* (Hackett, 1983).
- \_\_\_\_\_. *Über ein vermeintes Recht, aus Menschenliebe zu lügen*. 1797. Translated by Gregor as “On a supposed right to lie from philanthropy” (in *Immanuel Kant: Practical Philosophy*) and by Lewis White Beck as “On a Supposed Right to Lie from Altruistic Motives” in *Immanuel Kant: Critique of Practical Reason and Other Writings in Moral Philosophy*. (U. of Chicago, 1949; reprinted Garland, 1976).
- \_\_\_\_\_. *Erneuerte Frage: Ob das menschliche Geschlecht im beständigen Fortschreiten zum Besseren sei*, Part II of *The Conflict of the Faculties*. 1798. Translated by Anchor as “An Old Question Raised Again: Is the Human Race Constantly Progressing?” (in both Beck *On History* and in Gregor *Immanuel Kant: Practical Philosophy*) and by Nisbet as “A Renewed Attempt to Answer the Question: ‘Is the Human Race Continually Improving?’”

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