

Collaboration to battle climate change

Prof. Peter Tufano

Baker Foundation Professor, HBS

Senior Advisor, Salata Institute for Climate and Sustainability




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

Agenda

- How did we get here? Who benefitted along the way?
- Why is it so difficult to get somewhere else? Who will resist change and why?
- Levers for change: Top down, bottom up, and across—individually and in collaboration.
- Recent roadblocks

How did we get here?



(a) Change in global surface temperature (decadal average) as reconstructed (1–2000) and observed (1850–2020)





Who *benefitted* along the way? How?

Households

Companies

Governments
Politicians

(a) Change in global surface temperature (decadal average) as reconstructed (1–2000) and observed (1850–2020)



Who *lost*?

Households



Companies

Governments
Politicians


Future Generations

Planet

(a) Change in global surface temperature (decadal average) as reconstructed (1–2000) and observed (1850–2020)



Risk, conditional on two stylized paths



Who is *at risk*? For *which risk*?

At risk from:

**Inaction
(Physical risk)**

**Action
(Transition risk)**



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
Governments
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Future
Generations

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
Aside: Who bears the risk *ultimately*?



An example: Financial institutions

Three scenarios → outcomes on banks and insurers

	Early Action	Late Action	No Additional Action
Transition risks	Medium	High	Limited
Transition begins in	2021	2031	n.a.
Nature of transition	Early and orderly	Late and disorderly	Only policies that were in place before 2021
Peak UK shadow carbon price (carbon tax and other policies) (2010 US\$/tonne carbon dioxide equivalent)	900	1,100	30
Physical risks	Limited	Limited	High
Mean global warming relative to pre-industrial times by the end of scenario (°C)	1.8	1.8	3.3
Mean sea level rise in the UK (m)	0.16	0.16	0.39
Impact on output	Temporarily lower growth	Sudden contraction (recession)	Permanently lower growth and higher uncertainty
Average annual output growth in the UK (per cent)	Year 6-10: 1.4 Year 11-15: 1.5 Year 26-30: 1.6	Year 6-10: 1.5 Year 11-15: 0.1 Year 26-30: 1.6	Year 6-10: 1.4 Year 11-15: 1.4 Year 26-30: 1.2




Sources: Participating firms' submissions and Bank calculations.

Implications

Chart 4.1: Climate-related losses are larger in the late action and no additional action scenarios

Additional cumulative climate losses over scenario ^(a) ^(b)




Sources: Participating firms' submissions and Bank calculations.

- Losses greatest with no action
- Physical risks more costly than transition risks
- Losses lower with earlier action, i.e, more aggressive policies to contain emissions

Why so relatively low?

Chart 4.1: Climate-related losses are larger in the late action and no additional action scenarios

Additional cumulative climate losses over scenario (a) (b)



Sources: Participating firms' submissions and Bank calculations.


“Based on banks’ and insurers’ projections in this exercise, the overall costs to these firms from the transition to net zero should be **bearable without substantial impacts** on firms’ solvency positions, for example through a combination of lower retained earnings and **increases in margins on lending to higher risk sectors**, and also **because not all of the losses on insurers’- investments would ultimately fall on shareholders.**”

What do we need? Rapid and decisive action



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Impact on output	● Temporarily lower growth	● Sudden contraction (recession)	● Permanently lower growth and higher uncertainty
Average annual output growth in the UK (per cent)			

Who will oppose?

Who might object? Or stall?



(a) Change in global surface temperature (decadal average) as reconstructed (1–2000) and observed (1850–2020)



Who can exert pressure? Where?

Government


Vigorous enforced policies

Corporations

- Individual action
- Collective action

Households

- Buying, Voting, Working
- Movements



Who exerts pressure? Where?

Government


Vigorous enforced policies

Corporations


- Individual action
- **Collective action**

Households

- Buying, Voting, Working
- Movements



Business collaborations: A long history of fighting climate change



Ongoing work with Knut Haanaes (IMD) and Matteo Gasparini (Oxford)

A sampling of alliances

Business Ambition for 1.5°C	ZDHC	Better Futures Australia
Race to net zero	Climate action 100+	Tech zero task force
SME climate hub	Net Zero Banking Alliance	The Food and Agriculture Alliance (FACA)
The chambers climate coalition	Japan climate initiative	Second Nature
We mean business coalition	Climate group EV100	Sustainable hospitality alliance
Green tech alliance	Net Zero Asset Owners Alliance	Beyond Oil and Gas Alliance (BOGA)
GFANZ	Asia Investor Group on Climate Change (AIGCC)	OGCI Oil and Gas climate initiative
Investors group on climate change	Paris aligned investor initiative	Water utility climate alliance
IIGCC (Institutional investors group on climate change)	NECCUS	Business Alliance to Scale Climate Solutions
RE100	Better building partnership	BASCS
Net zero Asset Managers initiative	IRENA Coalition for Action	Net Zero Insurance Alliance
PCAF	First movers coalition	The Climate Finance Leadership Initiative
		Global sustainable investment alliance

Ongoing work with Knut Haanaes (IMD) and Matteo Gasparini (Oxford)

Actions of alliances

Build awareness

Work with policymakers to shape policy and regulation



Setting standards

Develop new climate and sustainability standards (e.g., disclosure)



Setting targets

Set coordinated climate targets and objectives



Convene

Convene key actors for finding solutions for fighting climate change



Drive implementation

Mobilise institutions to implement climate targets and objectives



Create credible market pull

Jointly set common standards for procurement across the value chain



Ongoing work with Knut Haanaes (IMD) and Matteo Gasparini (Oxford)



What makes alliances more effective?

- Identified
- Not identified
- General alliances

	Provide vision	Define accountability measures	Align incentives	Convene highly committed	Provide solution	Coordinate activities	Generate trust	Implement operating model	Convening alliances
Gasparini, Haanaes, Tufano (in process)	●	●	●	○	●	●	●	●	●
Oxford decisive decade	●	●	○	○	○	○	●	○	○
Hale et al.,	●	●	●	○	○	○	●	○	○
Boston Consulting Group	○	●	○	●	●	●	●	○	○
Kanter & Hayirli	●	○	●	●	●	●	●	○	○
The Collaborative imperative	●	○	●	○	○	○	●	○	○

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CEOs vs. Alliance/System Leaders

Traditional CEO

- “One” structure (often high complexity inside)
- Competitive strategies (win through advantage)
- Power and authority to allocate resources and make people decisions
- Control over own resources
- Focus on mobilizing resources inside
- Need to define clear objectives and incentives
- A mandate to develop and drive strategies

System leader

- Multiple organizations (often a whole system)
- Collaborative strategies (convene communities)
- Must rely of “soft” power and ability to engage and energize others
- Need to attract resources - disappear fast
- Focus on mobilizing external resources
- Need to be humble, good listeners, and skilled facilitators
- Need to uncover and define vision to drive change

Ongoing work with Knut Haanaes (IMD) and Matteo Gasparini (Oxford)

Problems for alliances

Description

Believing you are the CEO

Coming in with the corporate hat does not work. Leaders must respect the different realities of alliances to succeed

Aspirations are not met with resources

Many alliances have a purpose and aspirations that require much more resources than they command

The pop-up model

Many climate alliances have emerged quickly and don't build institutions. For example, the secondee trap, where great talent comes and goes

Negative resource cycle

The negative resource cycle where the ambition to survive leads to a broader scope and complexity

Naïve understanding of implementation

Alliances can be great for building awareness, for setting standards, for mobilizing engagement, but they can easily slip into implementation

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Challenges from status quo

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ESG May Be an Antitrust Violation


I'm investigating a coordinated effort to allocate markets.

By Mark Brnovich
March 6, 2022 4:40 pm ET

“As attorney general of Arizona, I have a responsibility to protect consumers from artificial restrictions on production. That’s why I’ve launched an investigation into [Climate Action 100+ group] potentially unlawful market manipulation”

Ongoing work with Knut Haanaes (IMD) and Matteo Gasparini (Oxford)

Last week's challenge



“(T)he Glasgow Financial Alliance for Net Zero (GFANZ) and the Net Zero Asset Managers initiative (NZAM) are potentially violating U.S. antitrust law by coordinating their members’ agreements to “decarbonize” their assets under management and reduce emissions to net zero—with potentially **harmful effects on Americans’ freedom and economic well-being.**

Accordingly, to help the Committee better understand GFANZ’s and NZAM’s roles in coordinating agreements among their members to “decarbonize” assets under management and reduce emissions to net zero, please produce, for the period from January 1, 2020, to the present:

(1) – (6): **PT: the kitchen sink**

Please produce the requested information as soon as possible, but no later than 5:00 p.m. EDT on **July 20, 2023.**

Ongoing work with Knut Haanaes (IMD) and Matteo Gasparini (Oxford)

Take-aways

- How did we get here? Our collective preferences and desires, satisfied/created by companies and permitted by government.
- Why is it so difficult to get somewhere else? Same answer. If can pass along costs, easier (except for ultimate bearer)
- Levers for change: Top down, bottom up, and across—individually and in collaboration. Collaboration useful, but requires complementary capabilities.
- Recent roadblocks. Divide and conquer (or at least delay)

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